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CHAPTER I

AMERICAN REACTION TO THE CRISIS IN EUROPE, 1791-1801

The geographical separation of the United States and Europe by
no means precludes a constant contact and notable relationship between
the two continents.

In the field of economics as well as politics con

ditions and situations have arisen which, although occurring on one
continent, have had a definite impact on the other.

The interrelation

ship between the two continents is best illustrated by events in the
early decades of American national history.
The French revolution which had broken out in 1789 was proceed
ing along an ever increasing radical path.

Great Britain looked upon

that revolution, at least during the early stages, with satisfaction,
for to most Englishmen it spelled the collapse of a traditional enençr.
The other European powers, Prussia, Austria, and Russia, were too con
cerned with the final partition of Poland to pay much attention to the
internal affairs of France.

However, by 1791 those once seemingly dis

interested powers began to take a second look at the activities of
their neighbor.

The French had begun to call upon other peoples to

throw off the yoke of monarchical servitude.

As a result of revolu

tionary propaganda infiltrating their countries the reigning monarchs
of Austria and Prussia, Leopold II and Frederick William, joined to
gether under the Declaration of Pillnitz for joint action in restoring
an absolute monarchy in France.
The result of the Rillnitz agreement was a hostile relationship

1
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between France and Austria, for it constituted a direct threat to the
success of the revolution.
war on Austria.

Thus, on April 20, 1792, France declared

The outcome, after five months, was the retreat of

the Austrian and Prussian armies back across the Rhine after the battle
of Valny, September 20, 1792.
proclaimed.

Two days later, the French Republic was

French enthusiasm for the revolution continued to mount,

combined with the rapid growth of a nationalistic spirit, which reached
its climax January 21, 1793, with the execution of Louis WI.
Fear continued to increase in the courts throughout Europe re
sulting in other nations being drawn into conflict with France.

Nota

ble among these were Spain, Portugal, Great Britain, and Naples who
joined forces with Austria and Prussia.

Across the channel, England

not only declared war, but the government soon became extremely reac
tionary.

Anything that could be considered in the light of a reform

measure was looked upon with suspicion or accused of emanating from
Jacobins.

"Finally, in 179b, the government was so far blinded by

panic," according to Trevelyan, "that it sought the lives of the Re
formers."^

Had it not been for the jury system, England could have

undergone a reign of terror similar to the one in France.
The hostilities in Europe had a two-fold effect upon the United
States.

In one sense the belligerents, particularly France and England,

treated Americans with contempt and encroached upon their commercial
rights.

However, the affairs in Europe also fostered prosperity on the

opposite side of the Atlantic.

France expected aid from the United

States under the terms of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 1778.

^George M. Trevelyan, History of England (Garden City, 1956),
p. 90.
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The terms of that treaty allowed French ships to use American ports and
bring with them their prizes.

At the same time American ports were to

be closed to ships of nations at war with France.

In an attempt to

achieve the pledged support and at the same time mobilize public opin
ion favorable to France, Edmond Charles Gênât was sent as minister to
the United States.

Upon his arrival in Charleston he took advantage of

American sympat%- for France and outfitted privateers to attack British
merchant vessels.

Moving on to Philadelphia he again noted the Ameri

can democratic spirit, for as he entered the city he was met by cheer
ing crowds.
Paris.

Democratic clubs were organized patterned after those in

However, his mission was destined to failure, for Washington

refused the requested aid.

Due to the rebuke he had received Genêt

threatened to appeal directly to the people, thus going over the head
of the American government.

His high-handed activities led Washington

to request that he be recalled.

this time the French government had

grown more radical, and Genêt was now out of favor.

Fearing for his

life should he return to France, Qen'et asked asylum in the United States.
It was mercifully granted.
England was mistress of the seas; thus France had to face a
possible blockade of her colonies by the British navy.

As a result of

naval pressure France subsequently opened the doors to American com
merce.

The area of greatest profit for American merchants was the

French possessions in the West Indies from which Americans had been
barred prior to the outbreak of war in Europe.

Now France was depend

ent upon neutral nations to transport the colonial products from that
area, and to cariy necessary supplies to them on the return voyage.
June, 1793, Britain issued an Order in Council stating that neutral

In
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vessels carrying goods to French ports were to be seized.

The purpose

of the June order was to keep materials necessary for war from reaching
France.

Next, England invoked the Rule of 17^6, which in effect stated

that neutral shipping barred in time of peace could not be opened in
time of war.

The effect was to declare ships carrying produce of a

French colony or supplies for them to be legal prize.

The impact on

the United States was to proscribe trade with the West Indies, for the
British immediately set about to seize neutral commerce and America was
the leading carrier.
Great Britain also maintained the right of impressment, contend
ing that neutral nations which allowed the sailors of warring nations
to serve in their navies were going beyond the character of neutrals by
depriving the hostile powers of the means of cariying on war.

Letters

of naturalization and certificates of citizenship were ignored.

A lit

eral interpretation of the British impressment policy would simply mean
a British subject could not give up his citizenship, or once a British
subject always a British subject.
Due to British actions on the seas, France claimed the right of
retaliation.

In 1795 France issued orders for the seizure of ships

carrying goods to England, or to any of France's enemies.

At the same

time an embargo was laid upon American shipping at Bordeaux.

France

continued her hostile treatment of the United States, for when Washing
ton sent Charles C. Finckn^ to replace James Monroe as Minister to
Paris, the French government refused to recognize him.

The French gov

ernment also declared that it would not recognize a minister from the
United States until reparations had been made for injuries suffered by
France due to America's interpretation of the Treaty of 1778.

Tension

s
between France and the United States continued to mount throughout
1796, and Washington's second term ended with war clouds looming on
the horizon.

However, not only France, but England as well, had com

mitted acts against the United States of a war-like nature, and had
the United States been a powerful, well prepared state it would have
been justified in declaring war on either or both.

As Jefferson later

stated, "The difficulty of selecting a foe between them has spared us
many years of war, and enabled us to enter into it with less debt,
more strength and preparation.

As for France and England, with all

their prominence in science, one is a den of robbers and the other of
pirates."^
On the European continent, Napoleon was victorious in Italy, thus
French national spirit remained high, and insults upon the United States
continued to mount.

The best known incident was the famous X Y Z Affair.

President Adams had dispatched a commission to France consisting of John
Marshall, Charles C. Pinckney, and Elbridge Gerry.

Upon their arrival

they were refused audience, and in order to obtain recognition were re
quested to pay directly into the hands of the Directory a sum of $2^0,000.
In addition, they were told an apology must be made for Adams' derogatory
speech to Congress, and a loan must also be pledged in the amount of
$6,^00,000.

When these conditions were refused, Talleyrand, the Foreign

Minister, made it known that the Federalist members of the commission
could accomplish nothing by remaining in France.

Thus, Pinckney and

Marshall returned, leaving Gerry behind to negotiate.

^Francis A. Walker, The Making of the Nation, 1783-1817 (New York,
1902), p. 121.
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Throughout the period of turmoil in Europe the United States
officially played a relatively passive role.

Although angered at the

treatment her merchant vessels and sailors received at the hands of
the British and French, Washington preferred to steer a neutral course.
On April 22, 1793, he issued a proclamation of neutrality in which he
stated:
policy has been and will continue to be, while I have the
honor to remain in the administration, to maintain friendly
terms with, but to be independent of, all the nations of the
earth; to share in the broils of none; to fulfil our own en
gagements; to supply the wants and be the carriers for them
all; being thoroughly convinced that it is our policy and
interest to do so. Nothing short of self-respect and that
justice which is essential to a national character ought to
involve us in war; for, sure I am, if this country is preserv
ed in tranquillity twenty years longer, it may bid defiance in
a just cause to any power whatever; such in that time would be
its population, wealth, and resources.3
The Cabinet was in agreement, with the exception of Madison who
opposed the measure.

Due to their divergent views he and Hamilton,

writing under the pen names Helvidius and Pacificus, filled the papers
with their arguments.

It was due to Washington's belief in neutrality

that the requests of Genêt were denied, and when the French minister
attempted to appeal to the American people to achieve his goals Wash
ington demanded his recall.
Trade was one of the foremost goals in the minds of many Ameri
cans, but it was being thwarted by both belligerents.

In March of 179h

a thirty day embargo was levied, which was extended for an additional
thirty days.

The law excluded foreign ships from United States ports

and kept American ships at home for the specified period.

llbid., p. 101.

The measure
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was backed primarily by the Republicans, and was designed to call
attention particularly to the British acts of seizure and impressment.
It was allowed to expire, however, even though many Republicans urged
that it be continued.

As a result the supporters of such

measures

brought forward a non-importation bill directed primarily at British
commerce.

It failed in passage in the Senate with the vice-president

casting the deciding vote.

The more radical Republicans within the

country called for war with England.

In order to avoid a possible war

and at the same time prepare should one materialize. Congress, on May
22, 179b, passed an arms embargo.

Cannons, muskets, and other types

of war equipment were restricted from the export trade.

However, the

embargo of May was allowed to expire after one year when the danger
of war had subsided.

The relaxing of tension was caused by the draft

ing of the Jay Treaty.
The clamor for war in the United States was particularly irri
tating to Washington who was determined to follow the path of peace.
In order to avoid the possibility of armed conflict John Jay, then
Chief Justice, was sent to negotiate a treaty of commerce with England.
After four months of talks with Lord Grenville the treaty was finally
drafted in November of 179L.
xd-th mixed emotions.

Americans received the news of the treaty

It had relieved the possibility of immediate war,

but its terms were inadequate.

Britain still maintained the rights of

search and seizure, and had also refused to concede the impressment
issue.

Thus, in some sections of the United States that document was

viewed as being worthless.

In fact, in Charleston the British flag

was dragged through the streets and burned at the home of
In New York, Jay was burned in effigy.

the consul.
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Daring the year 179$ the United States was once again pursuing
the practice of free trade.

The Jay Treaty had, however, aroused the

anger of France who felt it was a direct rejection of the Treaty of 1778.
The French government declared its alliance with the United States at an
end, and French ships increased their assaults on American commercial
vessels.
The problem of resolving the differences between France and the
United States rested on the shoulders of John Adams after his inaugur
ation in 1797.

This was no simple task, for shortly after he took

office Adams received news that the French government had refused to
recognize Pinckney.

Adams called Congress into special session, at

which time he used language so strong as to create resentment in the
French Directory. In light of the existing situation a new arras em
bargo was passed, and again it was for purposes of defense.

Other

steps toward preparing for possible war were also undertaken.
size of the arnçr was increased and war ships were built.

The

Port and

harbor defenses were strengthened, and French vessels were barred ex
cept in cases of emergency.

Also, an embargo was laid on ships trad

ing with France or French possessions under penalty of forfeiture of
ship and cargo.
The Administration was determined to prevent war if such a
possibility existed.

However, the peaceful commission sent to France

for such a purpose was insulted, and climaxed in the infamous X T Z
Affair.

The reports of the incident led Adams to state, "I will never

send another minister to France without assurance that he will be re
ceived, respected, and honored as a representative of a great, free.
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powerful, and independent nation."^
relations with France was

Thug, the restoration of friendly

placed in French hands.

The preparations for war which the United States was making
were not in vain, for an undeclared war did develope, fought only at
sea.

On February 9, 1799, the Constellation, commanded by Captain

Truxton, defeated the L'Insurgente.

The United States also recorded

other naval successes, but the crowning defeat of the French navy was
at the hands of Lord Horatio Nelson and the British fleet at Aboukir,
August 1, 1799.

Due to naval reverses, Talleyrand quickly communicated

with American Ambassador Mllliam Vans Murray in the Netherlands sug
gesting that France was willing to receive an envoy.

Adams seized

upon the opportunity to bring the conflict to a close, and sent Oliver
Ellsworth, Milliam R. Davie, and William Vans Murray to deal with
Napoleon who had become the First Consul.

The result of those nego

tiations was a treaty signed September 30, l800.
Under the terras of the Treaty of l800 the Treaty of 1778 was no
longer binding.

For that consideration the United States did not

claim arçr indemnities against France.
The prospect of peace with France was not particularly popular
in Federalist circles, and some felt Adams had bolted from the party.
However, the treaty was given a conditional ratification.

The reason

for conditional acceptance was the objection of a few Senators to the
article which stated the treaty should operate for eight years.
following year the Federalists were turned out of office and the
treaty was accepted without reservation.

^Ibid., p. 139.

The
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(^"rîîroughout the administrations of Washington and Adams the goals
of the United States had been peaceful co-existence with the nations of
Europe and unrestricted trade with all nations^ To obtain these goals,
at a time when Europe was locked in a life and death struggle, America
had used economic pressure rather than resort to armed conflict.

The

exception to that policy was the undeclared naval war with France in
1799 and I8OO.

However, the next ten years were to be the real test

of whether or not pacific measures could effectively bring about re
dress of grievances without resorting to a bloody solution.

CHAPTER II

WAR IN EUROPE 7ER5U3 FREE TRADE, iBOl-lBO?

War ushered in the 19th century in Ebrope with two victorious
enemies.

On land, Napoleon's armies were thought to be invincible,

but on the sea England reigned supreme.

In addition to the successes

of the "Grand Armies," Napoleon had visions of a colonial empire in
America, and had forced Spain under the Treaty of San Ildefonso,
October 1, I8OO, to cede to him the territory of Louisiana.

By March

of 1802, the two chief protagonists had realized their limitations,
and subsequently signed the Treaty of Amiens.

The treaty was to prove

to be only a truce, for Napoleon took the opportunity to extend his
empire on the continent, with British reaction being the refusal to
surrender Malta.

The Peace of Amiens lasted only sixteen months, for

in May of I8O3 the struggle was resumed.

With the renewal of hostil

ities, England immediately seized all Dutch and French ships in British
ports.

Napoleon retaliated by seizing all British ships, goods, and

sailors in French ports, and even those found in the principal German
ports of Hamburg and Bremen.

Not only were those actions for military-

purposes, but once again each was bent on waging economic war upon the
other.

In his attempts to defeat England by any means possible. Napol

eon occupied Hanover, which at that time belonged to the Grown of Eng
land, with the idea of restricting British trade from the ports on the
North Sea.

In May of l805 he moved against British goods in Holland

by having them confiscated.

The invasion of the Island Empire had
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always been one of the foremost goals in the mind of Napoleon, but the
possibility of such a venture vanished in the smoke of battle October
21, 1805, off Gape Trafalgar.

With the success of Nelson and the fleet

England became the undisputed mistress of the seas, and any serious
challenge to that supremacy was not to arise within the span of the
19th century.
During the sixteen months truce the trade of neutrals was re
opened, but with the renewal of hostilities each set about to halt
neutral trade in the hope of delivering a telling blow upon the other.
America was to suffer most from that determination, since it had become
the leading neutral trading nation.

England again invoked the Rule of

17^6, and British warships began seizing American vessels trading with
the West Indies.

The vessels and cargoes captured were then condemned

in the British Admiralty Courts.

In June of I8O3, an Order in Council

was issued upholding the American argument for the doctrine of broken
voyage.

Under that policy American ships could carry goods of French

colonies if those products were first brought into an United States
port.

In doing so the American merchants would be obliged to pay im

port duties before the goods could be reshipped.

Thus, the British

were relying on "American tariffs, and the inconvenience of unloading
goods there, to prevent excessive re-exports to enençr territory."
August of 180L, another Order in Council was issued.

In

The August order

was for purposes of blockage, stating that the North Sea coast from
the mouth of the Seine to Ostend was closed to trade.

Not only was the

0. Allen, Great Britain and the United States, A History of
Anglo-American Relations, 1783-ï^'^2 (New Yor'tc, 195!))', p.' 3TIi.
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'

continent of Europe being slowly closed to trade ty blockade, but it
was determined that the Rule of 1756 should be given a literal inter
pretation.

American merchants had found a way to avoid the Rule of

17^6, by first bringing French colonial goods into American ports.

In

so doing th^ claimed the merchandise had become nationalized and that
thQT were free to carry it to any place in the world.

That principle

had been upheld by the British under the Order in Council of June,
1803; however, Americans felt it rested on an uneasy foundation.

Al

though the British had relaxed their control on neutral commerce they
had not sacrificed the principle of seizure.
The Essex Case of July, 1805, succeeded in making void the Order
in Council of June, I8O3.

Sir William Scott of the British Admiralty

Court established the doctrine of continuous voyage.
was a complete reversal in British policy.

Scott's decision

Even though United States

ships sailed first to an American port he held that they were actually
on a continuous voyage and the stop but a small inconvenience.

Thus,

American ships engaged in trade with the French colonies became lawful
prize.
The Order in Council of August, l80ii, was replaced by the order
of May, 1806, which increased the length of the European coastline said
to be under blockade.

The May order declared the coast from Brest to

the mouth of the Elbe to be closed, a distance of approximately eight
hundred miles.

The purpose for the May order was to stop the flow of

goods into France by way of the Dutch and German ports on the North Sea.
The French answer to the British blockade was the issuance of
the Berlin Decree in November, I806.

Napoleon proclaimed Britain to be

in a state of blockade and forbade the importation of British goods into

ports controlled by France,

All trade in British merchandise was for

bidden, and private property belonging to British subjects became open
to seizure.

France did not have the naval power to enforce the decree,

but was able to seize the ships sailing from British ports to those of
France.

If the Berlin Decree had been effective the trade of neutrals

would have been eliminated from most of Europe by the blockades which
France and England both levied.

However, the Berlin Decree was not

enforced until September of the following year.
Impressment continued to be a point of contention between Eng
land and the United States.

Britain was willing to make a slight

concession on the issue by offering to accept certificates of citizen
ship, if these were issued by the United States Admiralty Courts.

The

certificates were to be accepted as proof of origin, and be an insurance
policy against impressment.

The British government would not, however,

consent to recognize certificates of naturalization.
Throughout the first four years of the 19th century American
relations with the powers of Europe had been greatly improved.

After

the Convention of Montefontaine of I8OO tension between the United
States and France had been relaxed as it had with England following
the signing of the Jay Treaty, j^fferson in his first inaugural address
proclaimed America's position at the time:

"Peace, commerce, and honest

friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none."j

However,

fear and apprehension suddenly swept the country when the news of the
retrocession of Louisiana by Spain to France was made known.

It was

^John Holladay Latane and David ¥. Wainhouse, A History of
American Foreign Policy (New York, 19^0), p. 123.
~

one thing to have a weak degenerate power such as Spain for a western
neighbor, but quite another to have one with the ambitions Napoleon
professed.

It was Jefferson's belief that such proximity might event

ually lead to war, and caused him to remarks
The day France takes possession of New Orleans fixes the
sentence which is to restrain her forever within her low water
mark. It seals the union of two nations who in conjunction
can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that
moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation.
. . . This is not a state of things we seek or desire. It is
one which this measure, if adopted by France, forces on us, as
necessarily as any other cause, by the laws of nature, brings
on its necessary effect.'
Thus, Napoleon's plans for colonization in America were pushing
the United States into the arms of England.

However, Jefferson's fears

were eliminated when Napoleon offered to sell the whole territory.
Mith the transfer of Louisiana December 20, I803, the apprehensions
of the nation were once again settled, and friendly relations with
France were restored.
Throughout the first year of renewed hostilities in Europe
little hardship was felt in America.

As late as November 8, iBOii,

Jefferson in his annual message to Congress reported, "With the nations
of Europe in general our friendship and intercourse are undisturbed,
and from the governments of the belligerent powers especially we con
tinue to receive those friendly manifestations which are justly due to
an honest neutrality."®

Due to the uneasy feeling which resulted from

the hostilities in Europe, the Senate on December 28, 18014, refused to
allow a bill to be printed which would have prevented the arming of
merchant vessels.

It was thought if seizures were resumed by either

7lbid., pp. 123-12%.

^^bid., p. 123.
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side American ships should have the means of defense.

Other defensive

measures were also adopted, for on March 2, l805, Congress authorized
the sum of $60,000 to be used by the President for the purpose of
building not more than twenty-five gunboats.
9
for the protection of ports and harbors.

These were to be used

The following day the Pres

ident was empowered to order any foreign armed vessel to depart from
American territorial waters.

If the vessel refused the President or

persons designated by him were granted the power to use any military
or naval force available to compel obedience.

Section 6 of the same

law declared foreign officers trespassing on American ships to be
10
liable for arrest, fine, and imprisonment if they were captured.

In

effect, the United States Congress by the passage of the latter bill,
had declared impressment to be a criminal act, and had granted author
ity for the punishment of those involved in the practice.

From Con

gressional reaction to the impressment issue it must be noted that the
United States had rejected the British offer to accept certificates of
citizenship.

The grounds for refusal were based on the idea that if

an American seaman lost his certificate the British would assume the
right to impress him.

Thus, the principle of impressment remained in

the British offer, to which the American government could never consent.
Another act of March 3 was passed placing an embargo on all armed mer
chant vessels under penalty of forfeiture.

If enforcement were impos

sible, due to the ship's being already at sea, the owner could be sued

^Annals of The Congress of the United States, 8th Congress,
Second Session ^Washington, 18^?%, p. lèSlIT"
l°Ibld.,pp. 1696-1697.
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"11
in the amount of the ship's value.

Here it must be noted the change

in policy by the American government.

Whereas, in December of 180L,

it was thought necessary to allow merchant ships the means of defense,
ty March of l80^, any armed defense which might be construed to be an
act of war was to be definitely avoided.

America had made its position

clear; it would not accept any foreign act which would in any way in
terfere with its commercial rights, and at the same time was not going
to permit an act of violence to occur which might lead to war.
In l805, James Monroe arrived in England as minister to replace
Rufus King who had resigned.

Upon Monroe's arrival, relations between

the two countries began to grow more and more hostile.

"So rapid was

the mutual dissipation of confidence that common sense seemed to desert

12

the British Government."

However, Monroe entered into negotiations

principally on the Essex Case, and a treaty was subsequently drawn which
appeared to be to the satisfaction of both Jefferson and William Pitt,
the British Prime Minister.
Pitt died, January, l80^.

Before the proposed treaty could be signed

Negotiations were later resumed with Charles

James Fox representing the British government.

Fox had a tendency to

be sympathetic toward America, but even so he was not willing to sacri
fice any principle which would in any way hinder the effectiveness of
the British fleet.

The illness of Fox caused negotiations to be once

again terminated, and the hated practices of seizure and impressment
continued.
%th the collapse of friendly relations the United States Congress

"^^Ibid., pp. 1698-1699.
C. Allen, op. cit., p. 308.
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on April 18, I806, passed the Non-Importation Act.

The Non-Importation

Act was aimed primarily at injuring British commerce, thus making Amer
ica's indignation over British practices known.

Under the terms of

the law goods such as leathers, silks, hemp, tin and brass, glass,
silver, and woolens valued at more than five shillings per square yard
were prohibited from importation.

If the smuggling of these goods were

attempted customs officials and naval officers were granted the power
13
of confiscation.

The Non-Importation Act thus became, "the first

measure indicative of resentment or retaliation which was taken by our
TI
government."
Three days after the passage of the Non-Importation Act Congress
granted to the President the power to maintain in service as many armed
1^
vessels and gunboats as he thought necessary. '

At the same time

$150,000 was appropriated for strengthening port and harbor defenses,
and $250,000 for the construction of not more than fifty additional
gunboats.America was gradually becoming prepared should there be
an outbreak of armed conflict resulting from the mounting tension with
Great Britain.
fense.

Still the preparations made were for purposes of de

The gunboats could not be used in operations far from land,

which served to illustrate that the United States wuld fight only if
attacked, and the fundamental goal was still neutrality,

^^Annals of The Congress of the United States, Ninth Congress,
First Session (Washington, 1852), p. 1259. ~
"1 }

John T. Morse, Jr., John Quincy Adams (New York, 1895), p. UO.
l^Annals of The Congress, op. cit., p. 1272.
l^IbidU, p. 1287.
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The Order in Council of May, 1806, brought vigorous protests
from the United States.

America considered it a paper blockade, and

denied that a coastline could be blockaded without an adequate force
being stationed outside the strategic ports.

Great Britain agreed that

for a blockade to be legal in international law it must be effectively
maintained.

However, the question arose over whether effective main

tenance meant England could simply block the entrances to the channel
and the North Sea, or whether ships had to be stationed along the
entire coast of northern Europe.

England defended the former system

while the United States protested invoking the latter.
By August of 1806, the Eon-Importation Act, together with
%lliam Pinkney, as ambassador at large, had arrived in England.

One

was a symbol of protest; the other a symbol of America's wish for peace
and harmony.

On August 22, treaty negotiations were resumed with Pink

ney and Monroe representing the United States and Lord Holland and Lord
Auckland representing the British government.

Pinkney, before leaving

the United States, had been instructed to press particularly the issues
of impressment, seizure, and trade with the West Indies.

In addition,

England was to make reparations for ships seized due to Judge Scott's
decision in the Essex Case.
ples to all three demands.

Britain refused to surrender the princi
It is doubtful if Jefferson expected a

treaty to be signed under his proposed terms.

However, Jefferson was

definitely opposed to war, and by making such demands, he had found a
method of asserting the rights of the nation by peaceful means.
treaty was subsequently drawn in December, 18O6,

A

According to Louis

Martin Sears, "No other treaty was ever negotiated by Americans in such

20
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flagrant disregard of their instructions."

The question of impress

ment was completely excluded, and no mention of reparations for seizures
was made.

However, some slight concession was made concerning the West

Indies trade.

The concession simply "permitted for the period of the

war the carriage of the products of the enemy's colonies from the United
States to Europe, provided the said products had been landed and had
paid the regular duties in the United States, and provided, further,
that on re-exportation they should remain subject to a duty of not less
than two percent.In reality this was a return to the policy that
had existed up until l80^.

The latter clause of the treaty was to pre

vent one hundred percent rebates to merchants involved in the West
Indies trade.

Not only did the British fail to yield to American de

mands, but a clause was attached to the document stating it would be
considered void unless the United States took immediate and active
steps against Napoleon.

To accept a treaty under the conditions set

down by England would have meant virtually complete submission to that
country, and would almost certainly have led to war with France.

Thus,

when Jefferson received the proposed treaty he refused to even submit
it to the Senate.
Due to the danger of impending conflict with either or both
France and England, and submission only a means of losing international
prestige, Jefferson sought another solution.

In early I806, Elbridge

Gerry had suggested an embargo as a possible remedy for the problems

l^Louis Martin Sears, A History of American Foreign Relations
(New York, 1927), p. 119.
^^Latane and Wainhouse, op. cit., p. 13O.
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facing the nation.

Jefferson seized that alternative as a means of

keeping the nation out of war, and by proscribing England's trade,
force them to respect American neutral rights.

To the President, and

the Republican faction in Congress, such a solution was the only al
ternative at the time.

CHAPTER III

EDEOPE&N ENCROACHMENTS ON AMERICAN TRADE

By 1807, the wars in Europe were again drawing to a close.
Napoleon had humbled the Austrian and Prussian armies, and at Eylau,
February 7,. I8O7, and Friedland, June lU, I807, the Russian artiy was
crushed.

There followed the Peace of Tilsit, July 7, 1807, with the

meeting of the emperors on a raft located in the River Neiraan.

Most

of Europe settled down to an uneasy peace following the treaty; how
ever, England was not willing to bring the conflict to a close.

Great

Britain continued to support those forces in Spain which were fighting
against Napoleonic control, and was willing to support with merchandise
and material any coalition which might arise against France.

Yet, in

1807, neither could do serious damage to the other militarily. Al
though Napoleon was at the peak of strength in land forces, he did not
have the naval power necessary to break the British sea curtain.

Nei

ther could England invade France, since a tremendous array would be
needed for the task.

Consequently, it became apparent that one could

not injure the other on the battlefield, nor could a battle of decision
be fought at sea.

The bitterness between the two belligerents was so

great that other means of destruction were sought.

Each resolved to

wage what might be considered unrestricted economic war upon the other.
Once again neutral trade was to suffer under the retaliatory laws of
England and France.
On January

7, 1807,

England issued an Order in Council under the
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pretense of retaliation for the Berlin Decree of the previous month.
In effect that order cut off the European coastal trade.

Neutral na

tions could still send ships to France, but if no markets were found
in the first port of entry and the vessel attempted to sail for another
port under French control it became fair prize for British men-of-war
and privateers.

Total economic war was the order of the day for both

belligerent powers.

England had control of the sea, and was determined

to do everything in its power to prevent the flow of neutral goods into
France.

On June 26, 1807, David Erskine, British Minister to the United

States, communicated with James Madison, Secretary of State, that due
to French successes on the continent England would re-establish a vigor
ous blockade.

According to Erskine trade to northern Europe would be

restricted ty blockading the mouths of the Eras, ¥esser, and Elbe rivers.
The next British order came in October.

It was intended to recall all

British seamen, and prohibit them from serving in foreign navies.

The

proclamation also empowered British warships to stop and search neutral
vessels in order to apprehend deserters.

Once again England used the

argument that neutrals which allowed English seamen to serve in their
navies were depriving the belligerent powers of the means of waging
war.

In reality the Order in Council of October l6 simply legalized

impressment at least to the British way of thinking.
another order was proclaimed.

In November still

The first proscribed neutral trade.

It

stated that all traffic to continental Europe must first pass through a
British port where duties would be levied before the ship could depart.
However, the vessel after unloading on the continent could not return
directly to its home port; instead, it was required to obtain clearance
once again before the return voyage could be undertaken.

Thus, the

2h

British collected on neutral traffic going and coming, a situation sum
marized by one commentator with the statements
19
the eneBçr except through Great Britain."

"There was no trade for

According to the British

the taxes levied on exports to France were justified since those taxes
increased prices.

England hoped the increased production costs with

resulting higher prices to the consumer would create economic panic and
force French industries to close their doors.
to France was forbidden.

The exportation of cotton

In addition, this order forbade the sale of

argr type of vessel to a neutral nation by an enemy of England.

This

was done in order to maintain a strict blockade of enemy ships by pre
venting fraudulent sales which would be cancelled when the ship reached
a distant port.

In justifying the orders of November 11, England chose

to omit the doctrine of retaliation.

According to Henry Adams;

The assertion that neutrals had acquiesed in the Berlin
Decree was struck out; the preamble was reduced, by Lord
Eldon's advice, to a mere mention of the French pretended
blockade, and of Napoleon's real prohibition of British com
merce, followed by a few short paragraphs reciting that Lord
Howick's order of January 7, l807 had not answered the desired
purpose either of compelling the eneBçr to recall those orders
or of inducing neutral nations to interpose with effect to
obtain their revocation, but on the contrary the same have
been recently enforced with increased vigor; and then, with
the blunt assertion that 'His Majesty, under these circum
stances, finds himself compelled to take further measures for
asserting and vindicating his just rights,' Perceval, without
more apologies, ordered in effect that all American commerce,
except that to Sweden and the West Indies, should pass through
some British port and take out a British license.
The French answer to the British orders was the issuance of the
Milan Decree.

It was proclaimed December 17, 1807, and carried the

T-^Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French
Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812' (Boston, 189^), p. 266.
Of)

Henry Adams, History of the United States, l805-l809 (New York,
1909), Vol. a, pp. 102-103.

2^
existing law one step farther by declaring all ships sailing to England,
or submitting to English search^ or paying English taxes, were subject
to seizure.

Napoleon based his action on three principal points:

(1) The orders of November 11, l807, which made liable to
search, detention, and taxation neutral ships and the ships
of England's allies and friends.
(2) The consequent denationalization of ships of all nations
by England.
(3) The danger that acceding to this demand would establish
tyranny into principle and consecrate it by usage even as the
English had availed themselves of the infamous principle that
the flag of a nation does not cover goods, and to have to their
right a blockage an arbitrary extension and which infringes on
the sovereignty of every state.^1
Regarding the United States, Napoleon, in his message to Champagny, his
Foreign Minister, made his position clears
. . . that since America suffers her vessels to be searched she
adopts the principle that the flag does not cover the goods.
Since she recognizes the absurd blockade laid by England, con
sents to having her vessels incessantly stopped, sent to England,
and so turned aside from their course why should the Americans
not suffer the blockade laid by France? . . . Why should Ameri
cans not equally suffer their vessels to be searched by French
ships? Certainly France recognizes that these measures are
unjust, illegal, and subversive of national sovereignty? but
it is the duty of nations to resort to force, and to declare
themselves against things which dishonor them and disgrace
their independence.^2
The Orders in Council ended all hope for a commercial treaty with
Ihgland.

When the proposed treaty arrived it was accompanied by a mes

sage from Canning which stated that if the United States ratified the
document the king would do the same,
. . .reserving to himself the right of taking, in consequence
of that decree, and of the omission of any effectual interposi-

"""Walter Wilson Jennings, The American Embargo, l807-lo09 (lowa
City, 1929), pp. 35^36.
Op
Henry Adams, op. cit., p. 110.
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tion on the part of neutral nations to obtain its revocation,
such measures of retaliation as his Majesty might judge expedient.23
A treaty signed under those conditions would have had little or
no value.

As a result Jefferson did not present the treaty to the

Senate, although he persisted in following a path of peace.

Instead

of breaking off negotiations and recalling his envoys, he simply re
turned the treaty to Monroe stating the need for further discussion.
Jefferson had realized the impossibility of entering into a satisfac
tory treaty with England, and was simply using further negotiations as
a peaceful means of presenting America's grievances.
The Chesapeake Affair, June 22, 1807, aroused the wrath of the
American people, and brought the impressment question to the forefront.
The Chesapeake, an American frigate, was passing Hampton Roads just
outside the three mile limit.

Due to its proximity to the American

coast the vessel was in a complete state of unpreparedness for combat
when it was ordered to stop tiy the fifty-gun British man-of-war Leopard,
commanded by Admiral Berkeley.

Complying with the British order the

Chesapeake stopped, was subsequently boarded, and Commodore Barron was
ordered to muster his crew in order that a search could be made for
deserters from the British navy.

When the latter order was refused

the Leopard opened fire killing or,wounding twenty-one men.

The

American vessel was once again boarded and four men were removed,
leaving the Chesapeake to limp back to its home port.
incident tempers flared in the United States.

Following that

Supplies labeled for

the British navy were destroyed, and many people demanded war. Jefferson

Z^Ibid., p. LB.
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preferred a less violent course, but was nonetheless determined to make
the British aware that such a flagrant violation of national sovereignty
would not go unnoticed.

He retaliated by requiring all British warships

to leave American waters, an act which only seemed to cause the British
to become more quarrelsome.
of August 6, 1807, stated?

As the English newspaper, The Morning Post
"Three weeks blockade of Delaware, Chesa

peake, and Boston Harbors would make our presumptuous rivals repent of
2ii

their puerile conduct."

Other newspapers including the Times and the

Courier expressed the same feeling.

The Times of August 26, I807, de

clared that, "the Americans could not even send an ambassador to France,
could hardly pass to Staten Island, without British permission."

The

impressment issue was brought to the forefront by the Chesapeake Affair,
and Jefferson demanded reparations and an end to the practice.

He ob

tained neither, for the British attitude at that time continued to be
26
"unfriendly, proud, and harsh J'
When the voices of protest were heard from America, Perceval
answered by declaring the United States as a neutral could not complain
unless the measures adopted were aimed exclusively at injuring neutral
commerce.

He also maintained that America had ceased to be a neutral

when it asked England to observe neutrality which France refused to
recognize.

He continued 'bj declaring that the United States had not

compelled France to retract its decrees, and their existence was suffi-

^^Quoted in Henry Adams, History of the United States, l80^-l809,
op. cit., p. kh'
^^Quoted in Ibid,, p.
^^Bernard Mayo, Jefferson Himself (New York, 19?ii), p. 2^9.
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cient proof of American acceptance.

The historian, Henry Adamg, con-

cluded that the Orders in Council were for purposes of extending and
protecting British commerce, and the argument of retaliation but a
pretense on the part of Perceval and Canning for forcing British trade
on France and other territories.

To substantiate Adams' argument. Lord

Hawkesbury complained that neutral nations supplied colonial produce
to France at much lower rates than paid by the British, a condition the
Orders in Council would prevent.

George Ross, Vice-President of the

Board of Trade, stated, "th^r (Orders in Council were a system of selfdefense, a plan to protect British commerce.If Adams' hypothesis
is correct, it was fear of French competition as well as American that
became the real motivating force behind the issuance of the orders.
Therefore, Perceval's object was commercial not political, and the
policies adopted were for the purpose of extending British trade and
restricting that of other nations.

The pretense of retaliation was
28

but "legal fiction," made in answer to American objections.

Shortly after the Chesapeake Affair, Monroe received his instruc
tions, and was told to make the following demands:
That the men taken from the frigate should be restored to
it; that the officers who had committed the aggression should
be exemplarily punished; that the practice of impressment from
merchant vessels should be suppressed; and that the reparation
consisting of those several acts should be announced to our
government through the medium of a special mission, a solemnity
which the extraordinary nature of the aggression particularly
required. "
Canning insisted the Chesapeake Affair should be treated separately and
apart from the general issues.

Since neither side was willing to con-

^7Henzy Adams, op. cit., p. 101.
^^Ibid.
qQ
John Holladay Latane and David W. Wainhouse, o£. cit., p. 13$.
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cede Monroe felt little could be accomplished by remaining in England.
He returned to the United States in October leaving William Pinkney
behind as his successor.
Following on the heels of Monroe, George Rose arrived in the
United States in January, I808, as a special envoy to Washington.

How

ever, he did not have the authority to discuss anything but the Chesa
peake incident; Jefferson refused to discuss the Chesapeake without the
discussion of search and seizure of American vessels, and of course,
impressment.

Rose stated flatly that he was not authorized to discuss

those things, and that he was going home,

"One wonders then why he had

come in the first place," Nathan Schachner has commented, "and what
Canning expected to gain by this unnecessary display of arrogance to
the United States government and people."

To illustrate British

attitude more clearly. Rose delivered a series of counter-claims in
which the British government demanded the immediate recall of the pro
clamation by Jefferson which forbade British sailors to land on American
soil.

In addition, Americans were to furnish the British ships with

water and other provisions.

The United States must also repudiate

Commodore Barron and allow no more deserters to serve in the navy.

The

last of those claims demanded an apology from the United States govern
ment for the presence of deserters on board the Chesapeake.

To accept

the British terms would have meant national humiliation, thus there
was no reason for Rose remaining in the United States.

Nevertheless,

in an attempt to maintain peaceful relations he was detained by informal
talks with Secretary of the Navy, Robert Smith.

The talks accomplished

^ONathan Schachner, Thomas Jefferson (New "York, 195Ï), p. 86$.
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little and British aggressions continued.

For example, the man-of-war

Bellona was ordered to depart from Chesapeake Bay.

Not only was the

order disregarded, but threats were made to take by force anything on
shore.

New York Harbor and Chesapeake Bay were blockaded, and impress

ment continued»
Throughout the turmoils in Anglo-American relations during the
early years of the 19th century, Britain maintained that the Orders in
Council were not aimed directly at injuring American commerce.
Napoleon was the prime target.

Instead,

The fact remains that America was the

leading neutral commercial nation, and although not specifically mentioned in the context of the orders, was to suffer most from them.

By

June 7, 1808, it was estimated that 6? American ships valued at eight
million dollars had been confiscated since November 11 of the previous
year.^^

In a report prepared by James Monroe, Secretary of State,

July 6, 1812, he declared that England captured 528 vessels before the
Order in Council of November 11, and 389 after, a total of 917 ships.
In the same report he noted the French, in enforcing the Napoleonic
decrees, captured 206 vessels before the Milan Decree and 307 during
its existence to August

32
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It must be noted that many of the

ships taken by France were in French ports at the time of seizure.
The taxes Britain levied against neutral vessels were nearly
prohibitive even if the United States had chosen to recognize British
control.

As a Baltimore paper declareds

$30,000, flour $10,000, and fish $5,000.

A cargo of tobacco was taxed
When totalled, the amount

^^Alfred Thayer Mahan, op. cit., p. 276.
^^Walter Wilson Jennings, op. cit., p. 37.
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would reach 2.^ million dollars paid to England In one year by the city
33
of Baltimore alone.
It is impossible to determine accurately the total number of
American seamen forced to serve in the British navy.

At the beginning

of the War of l8l2, 6,25^ cases were on file in the State Department.
lord Castlereagh, in January, l8ll, speaking in the House of Commons,
stated there were 3,300 men serving in British ships who claimed to be
American citizens.

With the outbreak of the War of l8l2, a British

Admiralty report showed that 2,5^8 American seamen were imprisoned for
iL
refusing to fight against their own country.^
In addition to seizures, taxation, and impressment the British
continued to maintain a strict blockade of northern Europe.
not the only area where neutral trade was restricted.

This was

As Mahan states,

"trade in the Mediterranean was swept away by seizures and condemna'icf
tlons, and that in other seas threatened with the same fate."^^

Louis

Martin Sears points out that the "blockade of continental Europe pre
saged disaster to neutral commerce in direct violation of one of
Jefferson's favorite concepts, that of a law of nature which guaranteed to nations at peace the rights of uninterrupted intercourse."

l6

In direct contrast to Jefferson's way of thinking, Lord Perceval main
tained England's right to suppress the existence of any neutral com
merce, "provided the suppression were consequential on an intent to

33ibid., p. 32.
^^Latane and Wainhouse, op. cit., pp. 132-133°
^%lfred Thayer Mahan, op. cit., p. 276.
^^ouis Martin Sears, Jefferson and the Embargo (Durham, 192?),
p. 19.
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injure France."

Due to the numerous infractions upon the rights of neutrality by
both England and France, the United States found the path of peace ex
tremely difficult to follow.

The government was faced with the complex

problem of how to make two powerful enemies respect the nation's rights
without submission or war.

Talk of declaring war upon both France and

England existed within the country, but to have undertaken the bloody
solution would have been unwise.

As Louis Martin Sears suggests, "the

decision to maintain neutrality rested it must be confessed more upon
the practical impossibility of attacking both offenders than upon any
theory that our own state of nature was peaceful."
United States join with one of the opposing sides.

Nor could the
Both were treading

heavily on national honor, thus opposing one would be considered sub
mission to the other.
join.

The question also existed as to which side to

Many Americans favored France; others favored England.

As a

result a declaration of war upon one would create rupture within the
country.

Arming merchant vessels, and the issuance of letters of marque

and reprisal were mentioned as possible solutions to the nation's prob
lems by Samuel Dana of Connecticut.

However, the opponents of that

course of action, led by Jacob Crowninshield of Massachusetts, argued
that if such steps were taken they would only lead to war with England.
Jefferson had his own reasons for not wishing to resort to armed con
flict.

In a letter to James Monroe he wrote, "if we go to war now, I

fear we may renounce forever the hope of seeing an end to our national

^^Henry Adams, op. cit., p. 8ii„
38
Louis Martin Sears, op. cit., p. 3^.
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debt."

He also commented that if peace could be maintained for

another eight years, the national income would be sufficient to carry
through a war without increased taxation or income.
Submission to the orders and decrees would have meant loss of
national honor, and, "would have been the most evasive, most vacillatory, and least dignified" course America could have followed.Thus,
by late l807, the United States was not in an enviable position.

War

was a possibility with either or both England and France marked by unpreparedness within the country.

The international prestige of the

nation was also being threatened at a time when America was seeking
to gain world respect.

As a result of those conditions, America "faced

)1
the severest crisis of our existence up to that time."

^^Albert J. Mock, Jefferson (New York, 1926), p. 26^.
^^Gilbert Ghinard, Thomas Jefferson (Boston, 1929), p. k^7.
^^Francis Franklin, The Rise of the American Nation (New York,
1913), p. 17a.

CHAPTER 17

TH3: ADOPTION OF THE EMBARGO

No leas a diplomat than Napoleon's Foreign Minister Talleyrand
once predicted that the United States would "be useful to England more
li2
than any other power and this usefulness will increase."
diction exemplified the thinking of Thomas Jefferson,

His pre-

The United States

exported food and raw materials essentially needed in Europe.

Jeffer-

son believed that to halt the supply would create economic crisis on
that continent.

Thus, he chose peaceful economic coercion as the tool

to achieve the redress of grievances from France and Great Britain.
The creation of what has become known as the Embargo began offi
cially December 17, 1807, in a Cabinet meeting called for the purpose
of discussing possible solutions to the problems facing the nation.
In that discussion the restriction of trade with England and the Euro
pean continent was discussed at length.

Immediately following the

session Albert Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury, voiced his opinion
that war was to be preferred.

He pointed out that a statesman should

not without extreme cause regulate the concerns of individuals.

Galla

tin also proposed that a time limit be established should the Embargo
be adopted.

The following day the Cabinet met again, and Gallatin's

proposal for a time limit was discussed, but was not approved.

James

JMadison then prepared the message which was signed by the President,

^^Bradford Perkins, The First Rapprochement England and the
United States, 1792-180^ (Philadelphia, 1955;, p. ÏB5T
3L
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and in turn sent to Congregs.

The Presidential message stated:

The coranninicatxon now made, showing the great and increasing
dangers with which our vessels, our seamen, and merchandise,
are threatened on the high seas and elsewhere, from the belli
gerent Powers of Europe; and it being of the greatest importance
to keep in safety these essential resources, I deem it ny duty
to recommend the subject to the consideration of Congress, who
-[fill doubtless perceive all the advantage which may be expected
from an inhibition of the departure of our vessels from the
ports of the United States.
Their wisdom will also see the necessity of making every
preparation for whatever events may grow out of the present
crisis.
No mention of economic coercion was made.

Instead, the message

simply called for an embargo for the purpose of protecting American
ships and cargoes from seizure, and their crews from impressment.
The Senate, on receipt of the message, immediately referred it
to a committee of five consisting of John Qulncy Adams of Massachusetts,
William Anderson of Pennsylvania, Stephen Bradley of Vermont, Andrew
Gregg of Pennsylvania, and Samuel Smith of Maryland.

The committee in

turn drew up the bill which Senator Smith presented.

On the third

reading William H. Crawford of Georgia asked that the bill be postponed
until the next day.

His motion to that effect was defeated.

Without

further debate or discussion the Senate passed the bill by a 22 to 6
majority.
Meanwhile the President's message had been read in the House of
Representatives.

Upon hearing the recommendation of the President,

John Randolph immediately arose, and proposed the following resolution,
"That an embargo be laid on all shipping, the property of citizens of

In

^

Annals of Congress, Tenth Congress, First Session (Washington,
185%), Vol. I, p. Ï5Ï5T
kAlbld., p. 5%.
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the United States, now in port, or which shall hereafter arrive."
The Randolph Resolution was tabled with the arrival of the Senatorial mesaage carried by Earriaon Gray Otia, Secretary.

The meaaage

stated, "The Senate have, in confidence directed me to inform this honorable Houae that they have paaaed a bill entitled, 'an act laying an
embargo on all ships and vessels in the ports and harbors of the United
States,* in which bill they desire the concurrence of this Rouse.
With the receipt of the Senate bill, the House on the motion of
Growninshield resolved itself into a committee of the whole for diacuaalon.

Joalah Quincy propoaed an amendment to allow the continuance

of fishing privileges under bond that the ships so engaged would carry
on no commerce with foreign nations and return to American porta.

The

I ly

Quincy amendment was defeated by a vote of

to 82.

Surdon S. Mum-

ford of New York proposed an amendment which would have limited the
duration of the embargo to sixty days.
defeated, the vote being L6 to 82.^^

The Mumford amendment was also

Following the defeat of the Mum-

ford amendment the final vote was taken.
favor,
law.

h9
opposed.

The tabulation showed 82 in

On December 22, Jefferson signed the bill into

The theory of peaceful economic coercion was the basis of six

years of government under the Jefferson Administration.

As Henry Adams

pointed out, "the idea of ceasing intercourse with obnoxious nations
reflected his jjefferson';^ own personality in the mirror of statesman-

^^Annals of Congress, Tenth Congress, First Session (Washington,
185%), Vol. 2, p. iZI&T"
^^Ibld., p. 1217.

k7lbid., p. 1218.

bBlbid., p. 1219.

k^IbldU, p. 1221.
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ship."^®
Jefferson's belief that an embargo would be a proper solution
to the nation's problems had been enhanced by letters from his friends
calling for similar action.
Italy, predicted success.

Joseph Barnes, stationed in Leghorn,

In his letter to the President he wrote:

In fine, we have only to Shut our ports and remain firm—
the People of England would do the rest—for British manufac
tures being precluded from the Continent of Europe almost
entirely, their chief resource is the U.S. consequently about
150,000 Manufactures being thrown out of Bread would rise in
Mass and compel the Minister to open our Ports at any price,
or they would Massacre him. The disposition of the People of
England I well know; having been about four years in that
island.
John Page, a boyhood friend, also confirmed Jefferson's belief
that an embargo would achieve the desired results.

In his letter he

noted:
. . . that an immediate embargo is necessary, because before the
usual meeting of the Congress all the British Ships will have
left us, and even our own Vessels and Sailors, who will be im
pressed or detained in British Ports throughout their empire5
and that their Ships of War and Privateers without further
notice will sweep our vessels which may be at Sea, from the Sur
face of the Sea; that an immediate stop to all intercourse with
Britain is indispensibly necessary, to retrieve our lost honor,
and bring the mad King to his senses; and that that measure
alone would be of more consequence than any naval and military
preparation we can make,52
The Eabargo prohibited all vessels under American jurisdiction to
sail to any foreign port, unless licensed by the Chief Executive.

No

foreign vessels were to be detained if they were already loaded before
news of the law had reached them, or if they were in ballast.

^^Heniy Adams, op. cit., p. 138.
^^Louis Martin Sears, op. cit., p. 55•
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.American coastal trade was permitted, but only under bond in the amount
double the value of the ship and cargo to insure its re-landing in an
American port.
It was Jefferson's belief that the newly enacted Embargo would
solve the four basic problems facing the nation.

By keeping American

ships at home the nation's honor would no longer be insulted on the
high seas.

The Embargo would save the ships from seizure, and their

crews from impressment»

Thus, America would preserve its wealth, which

was either being seized or destroyed.

By proscribing the flow of colo

nial goods and raw materials, economic pressure would be applied to
such an extent that England and France would be forced to repeal their
hated orders and decrees.

Last, and probably most important to Jeffer

son, the Embargo would prevent war, which the nation definitely needed
to avoid.
When the President's message was read in Congress there was no
mention of the British orders of November 11.

With the announcement to

the public of those orders many favorable comments were to be heard.
On January l8, IBOB, the Legislature of Virginia passed a resolution
declaring, "it is a duty we owe ourselves, to declare that we submit
with pleasure, to the privations arising from the energetic measures
recently adopted by the constituted authorities in laying an Embargo,
which meets our warm approbation."
From the General Court of Massachusetts, February 8, l808, came
the voice of approval stating, "we consider the imposing of the Embargo

^^Dice Robins Anderson, William Branch Giles (Menosha, Wisconsin,
191L), pp. 128-129.
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a wise and highly expedient measure, and from its important nature cal
culated to secure to us the blessing of peace.
Other arguments favorable to the Embargo were also being expres
sed.

The supporters of the measure held that it would force frugality

upon the people, and stop wasteful spending.

Since the United States

imported most of the luxury items it consumed, the Embargo would prevent
the flow of capital to Europe, and stop the importation of undesirable
foreign products.

It was argued that the Embargo would cause American

industry to expand, and force existing manufacturers to broaden their
horizons, with the result that national self-sufficiency would be
achieved.
With expanded industry, immigrants would be attracted to Ameri
can shores, resulting in a larger labor force, which in turn would
allow American citizens to remain on the farms.

The expansion of in-

dustiy was particularly true of the Philadelphia area.

The Philadelphia

Gazette of October 8, I8O8, noted "that comparatively little inconvenience was felt in that city or the surrounding neighborhood."

It was

also reported that constant civic improvements in Philadelphia gave
employment to between eight and ten thousand persons.Even the banks
in that city were extremely willing to loan money.

On November 17,

1808, the manufacturers of Philadelphia held a dinner celebrating their
industrial growth.

John Dorsey, the presiding officer for the occasion,

wore an American broadcloth suit to show that Americans could do without

%bid., p, 128
%oui8 Martin Sears, "Philadelphia and the Embargo," Annual Re
port to American Historical Association (Washington, 1925), Vol. 2, p.2^6.
^Ibid.
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the goods of Europe.
Thomas Jefferson never lost an opportunity to defend the Embargo
even after it was repealed.

On June 28, l809, he wrote that, "the bare

faced attempts of England to make ns accessories and tributaries of her
usurpations on the high seas have granted in this country an universal
spirit for manufacturing for ourselves, and reducing to a minimum the
number of articles for which we are dependent on her."
Commercial reaction to the Embargo was anything but favorable,
however, the followers of Jefferson pointed out that commerce could not
be carried on in safety before the law.

They noted that if commercial

interests were allowed to continue their activities, such a condition
would simply mean a recognition of British control over American trade.
Those advocates believed their argument to be valid since American mer
chants could only trade with the British Isles due to that country's
control of the seas.
The idea that the Embargo was less costly than war was strongly
defended by the Northampton Republican Spy of July 20, IBOB.

That news

paper declared:
The Embargo will produce temporary inconveniences; the loss
of a few thousand dollars; and give a little more idle time to
the citizens, who do not choose to turn their attention to
internal improvements. It will not starve anybody. On the
contrary, the staple necessaries of life %&11 be cheaper.
A war will produce the loss of millions of dollars, burning
and sacking of towns and cities, rape, theft, murders, streams
of blood, weeping widows, helpless orphans, the begging of
thousands, the ruin of agriculture, and an extensive deprava
tion of morals.

Gilbert Ghinard, op, cit., p. L71.
^®¥alter %l8on Jennings, op. cit., p. L].
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When the Embargo was attacked on the grounds that it ruined com
merce, and that it had not been specifically limited in time, David R.
Williams, Representative of South Carolina, and George W. Campbell,
Representative of Tennessee, came to its defense.

VJilliams noted that

the Embargo was only a suspension, not the complete annihilation of
commerce made "to gain the advantage of which it had been robbed."
Campbell answered that the Embargo was limited, even if it should last
for "a hundred years."
After the Embargo had been attacked on the grounds that it caused
a drop in the prices of agricultural products William Branch Giles noted
that the American farmers were receiving more for their surpluses under
the Qnbargo than they could have if the government had pursued any
other course of action, or even

maintained the status quo.

The news received from England was at first favorable, and gave
hope to the Administration that the Embargo might accomplish the desired
results.

%lliam Pinkney, writing to Madison in the summer of I8O8,

reported that the suspension of commerce was severely felt in England.
There were reports of rioting in Manchester, and the merchants of Liver
pool petitioned Parliament for relief.

Such reports aroused hope in

America that the Embargo would be successful.

Alexander Baring, one

of the foremost London bankers, denounced the Orders in Council, and
demanded their recall.

Edward Baines, a British economist, noted the

loss of American trade would be ruinous to Lancaster.

Even Lord Bath-

urst. President of the Board of Trade, sent a protest to the Prime
Minister requesting something be done to re-open American markets.

^^Heniy Adams, op. cit., p. 266.
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Merchants and manufacturers petitioned Parliament demanding the repeal
of the orders.

In their petition they presented evidence showing that

the United States normally purchased over ten million pounds in value
of English goods annually, but this would be lost since American markets
were closed.The cost of cotton went up fifty per cent in England,
and in a discussion in the House of Commons it was noted that only six
62
weeks supply of silk remained.

It must be noted that the United

States carried much of the raw silk used in British industry.

In all

nearly 200,000 Englishmen protested against the Orders in Council.
Yet, the British government remained steadfast, and refused to accede
to the demands and actions of Americans, or for that matter, their own
people.
Instead of repealing the Orders in Council, England attempted to
break the Embargo by encouraging disobedience among American merchants
and ship owners.

On March 28, l808, an Order in Council was issued

prohibiting warships and privateers from stopping any neutral vessel
carrying lumber or other supplies to the British West Indies or South
America.

The order also stated that upon reaching its destination the

neutral carrier was to be allowed to proceed to any port it chose, ex
cept those under blockage.

Thus, Great Britain was attempting to break

the Embargo by creating a nation of smugglers in America.

Due to British

encouragement the dollar became more important to some Americans than
patriotism, and the opposition which the law had encountered from the
beginning continued to mount.

^^Walter Wilson Jennings, 0£. cit., p. 8l.
^^Claude Bowers, Jefferson In Power (Boston, 1936), p. L6$.
^^Walter %l8on Jennings, op. cit., p. 82.

^^Ibid.

CHAPTER V

THE RUIN OF AMERICAN COMMERCE

The Embargo Act was "more arbitrary, more confiscatory than any
measure ever proposed by the Federalists»"

Such a statement made in

the twentieth centuiy might well have been heard in late 1807 when the
newly enacted law was being discussed.

John Randolph, "the most erra

tic and abusive speaker the American Congress has ever known," was
among the first to voice a similar opinion.His speech on the sub
ject has been recorded as follows:
This mode of cutting our throats to save our lives I do not
understand. To what extent did the argument go? Fully to
this—that in proportion as the belligerents pressed upon us
we must recede, and so promptly and rapidly too as never to
come in contact with them. This was certainly an admirable
recipe for avoiding war; one by which the swift-footed Achilles
himself might have kept out of the combat since he had only to
take his distance from the eneny and keep it. He did not ex
pect to have heard because any branch of our commerce was an
noyed by the belligerents that we should therefore annoy it
ourselves to a yet greater degree; that because it was liable
to partial attack we should annihilate it.
In the same speech and equally caustic was his statements
And yet to avoid this war, in which we are actually involved,
we are to do what? Show our heels to the eneny and our indig
nant fronts to our own hapless citizens. It was high time that
the vigor of this government should be displayed on some other
theatre than our own country and on some other objects than our
own citizens.

Gilbert Chinard, op. cit., p. Ii28.
^^ouis Martin Sears, A History of American Foreign Relations
(New York, 1927% p. llL.
^%xlliara Cabell Bruce, John Randolph of Roanoke, 1773-1833
(New York, 1922), Vol. 1, pp. 3?3::321.
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This was the same John Randolph who had proposed the resolution calling
for the Embargo.

then his sudden change in attitude?

According to

%lliam C. Bruce, Randolph's reversal was due to his opposition toward
using the Embargo as a coercive measure.

It was his belief that if the

United States was seeking redress war should be the alternative.
The greatest outciy against the Embargo came from the commercial
interests due to American commerce being swept from the seas»

M,thin

ten days Jefferson came under attack by these mercantile groups.

One

anorçrmous letter which he received from New York stated:
¥e are the shipping interests and we will take care that,
shall not be destroyed by your attachment to France, your im
placable enmity to d. B., and in short, by your madness and
folly—I have ever been a warm Republican but when I see my
country on the verge of destruction, I am compelled to oppose
those, whose measures I once approved.^?
Henry Adams described the immediate effect on commerce and those
connected with the industry when he wrotes
As the order was carried along the seacoast every artisan
dropped his tools, every merchant closed his doors, every ship
was dismantled, American produce--wheat, timber, cotton, tobacco,
rice, dropped in value or became unsalablej every imported arti
cle rose in price; wages stopped; swarms of debtors became bank
rupt; thousands of sailors hung idle round the wharves trying to
find employment on coasters, and escape to the West Indies or
Nova Scotia. A reign of idleness began; and the men who were
not already ruined felt that their ruin was only a matter of
time.°
From the town of Newburyport, Massachusetts, came the following reports
'The following is a list of vessels now laying in this port
embargoed as of Apr. l5, i808; 1$ ships, 27 brigs, 1 barque,
27 schooners, total 70 vessels»' As of July 12, i808, 'there
are now collected in our harbor 2h ships, 28 brigs, and 2^
schooners.' The report as of July Si, i808, 'Our wharves have

'^'^Louis Martin Sears, Jefferson and the Embargo, op. cit., p. 61.
^^Henry Adams, op. cit., p. 277.

now the stillness of the grave, indeed nothing flourishes on
them but vegetation.'69
Joseph Stoiy writing on the impact of the Embargo noted that due to the
withdrawal of American commerce, England was enjoying a monopoly in
world trade.
The commercial Northeast was not the only section of the United
States effected by the Embargo.
equal hardship.

The agricultural South was to suffer

%thin twelve hours after the law became known the

price of flour fell from $^.^0 to $2.^0 per barrel.Tobacco became
practically worthless, warehouses bulged with the surplus, and the ex
ports of that commodity fell from $^,^76,000 in 1807 to $838,000 in
71
1808.

The exportation of cotton declined from $1^,232,000 to

$2,221,000 with correspondingly lower prices.The price of wheat
71
fell from $2.00 to $.07 a bushel and land values constantly declined.
In general, federal revenue from customs duties dropped from $16,363,000
to $7,2^8,000.^^

Percentage totals illustrate America's loss.

Total

exports declined 79 per cent in value, and exports to England declined
by 83 per cent.?^

As opposition continued to mount due to the appalling

losses, margr Republicans began to question whether a law which cut the
value of exports from $108,000,000 to $22,000,000, and cut the national

^^Leonard D. White, The Jeffersonians (New York, 19^1), p. Ii5l^%athan Schachner, op. cit., p. 863.
'^^Dlce Robins Anderson, op. cit., p.

^^Ibid.

T^Nathan Schachner, op. cit., p. 876.
'^^Raymond Walters, Jr., Albert Gallatin (New York, 19^7), p. 209.
^Walter %l8on Jennings, op. cit., p. 78.
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revenue in half, was really worthwhile.'
An equally serious argument presented by the opposition was the
constant charge that the Embargo aided France in the conduct of its
wars.

Rufus King, in a letter to Christopher Gore, was among the first

to advance that concept.

In a letter he commented:

The thousand rumours in circulation, joined to the darkness
that covers the proceedings of the administration have produced
the strongest apprehension that it is meditated to bring about
a war with England upon points of inferior moment, in order to
avoid a decision of the insolent and humiliating demands of
France. The Embargo and non-importation together will amount
to the shutting of our Ports agt. England—a measure which it
is believed has been required by the Tyrant.??
Other cries of French influence were continually heard throughout the
United States.

Jefferson and Madison were accused of being French

citizens and that th^ had established the Embargo on Napoleon's order.
Albert Gallatin, who was responsible for the enforcement of the law,
was referred to in a resolution adopted in Glouchester, Massachusetts,
as a "Frenchified Genevan, whom we cannot but think a satellite of

78

Bonaparte."

Barent Gardinier of New York assailed Jefferson in the

House of Representatives, insisting that the Embargo had been laid at
the insistence of Napoleon and called upon the House, "not to go on
70
forging chains to fasten us to the car of the imperial conqueror." ''
He was called to order for his statements, and later challenged to a
duel.

The duel resulted in his being shot by George ¥. Campbell of

^^Allen Johnson, Jefferson and His Colleagues (New Haven, 1921),
Vol. 15^ p. 168.
^^Charles R. King, The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King (New
York, 1898), p. It2, from Rufus king "€0 Christopher Gore, bee. 3l, 1807.

78

Raymond Walters, Jr., 0£. cit., p. 207.

"^^Claude G. Bowers, op. cit., p. Lh9.
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Tennessee.

After that incident similar attacks on the administration

ceased in the House, but the Federalists continued with their ''fire
side" assaults.

As late as 1833 many individuals were still convinced

the Embargo had been imposed to assist Napoleon.

James Sullivan, ex-

governor of Massachusetts, wrote in October of that years
He 0^efferson] was willing to impose an annual loss of fifty
millions on his own countrymen, and enforce his system of
restrictions at the point of a bayonet, to aid Napoleon in
humbling England.
The Essex Junto, led by Timothy Pickering, was the most vocal of
any group expressing opposition toward the Embargo.

Pickering was known

for his pro-British tendencies, and he too accused Jefferson of prevent
ing a peaceful settlement with England, and taking orders from Napoleon.
He justified and minimized impressment alluding to the idea that the
British government had eveiy right to order home its citizens.

Pick

ering argued that Americans forced to serve in the British navy were
returned when proof of their origin was established.

In addition, the

Junto called openly for defiance of the Embargo laws and advocated
nullification by the states.

The work of the group, and the publica

tion of Pickering's pamphlet, which gained wide circulation, were not
without effect.

Following one of Pickering's speeches, July II, 18o8,

Jefferson was hung in effigy.

Still there were those in New England

who supported the Administration.

Pickering and his cohorts were also

hung in effigr, not only in Massachusetts, but in Pennsylvania as well.
James A. Bayard, although not a member of the Essex Junto, at
tacked the Embargo on the grounds that the withdrawal of American ships

®®¥alter Wilson Jennings, op. cit., p. L2.
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from the seas constituted submission to both France and Great Britain.
Commenting on the impressment issue Bayard noted that many American
seamen were leaving the country in order to find employment elsewhere.
He was of the opinion the United States lost more able bodied seamen
due to lack of employment than was due to impressment.

It was Bayard's

theory that the repeal of the Embargo would "be the first step in re
moving the impediments toward real peace with England.If such a
step was taken he felt that it would open the way for negotiations as
a means of bringing about redress, but if talk failed then a formal
declaration of war should be proclaimed.
The Embargo constituted commercial warfare according to Senator
George Logan of Pennsylvania.
cription was to be opposed.

To his way of thinking war of any des

Although a Republican, Logan referred to

the existing policy as being "dishonorable, barbarous, and unworthy of
an enlightened people," in that many of the Embargo's victims were
"unoffending women and children.
Josiah Quincy summarized the adverse economic impact of the Em
bargo when he stated:
As to its greatness, nothing is like it. Every class of men
feels it. Every interest in the nation is affected by it. The
merchant, the farmer, the planter, the mechanic, the laboring
poor; all are sinking under its weight. But there is this
peculiar in it; that there is no equality in its nature. It is
not like taxation, which raises revenue according to the average
of wealth, burdening the rich and letting the poor go free. But
it presses upon the particular classes of society in an inverse
ratio to the capacity of each to bear it. ^

^iMorton Borden, The Federalism of James A. Bayard (New York,
195%), p. 176.
^^Frederick B. Toiles, George Logan of Philadelphia (New York,
195%), p. 28k.
^^Walter Wilson Jennings, op. cit., p. 6l.
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Due to widespread unemployment many people moved to Canada, and in New
England talk of secession existed.

In that area committees of safety

were formed harking back to revolutionary days.

Some citizens an

nounced their intention not to assist in the enforcement of the laws,
and denounced them as being hostile to the liberties of a free people.
Even John Quincy Adams was to express fear that civil war might result
if the Eiabargo was not amended or repealed.
resulted from the Embargo.

Other social consequences

A crime wave swept the country, which

seemed to have been fostered by the willingness of the people to defy
the Embargo laws.

Heniy Adams noted the defiance toward the laws

brought social corruption and made "many smugglers and traitors, but
not a single hero."®^
The constitutional question arose over whether or not Congress
had the right to pass laws without a specified limit, and whether or
not that boc^ could deprive an individual of the right to manage his
own affairs.

During the September judicial term of I8O8 an Embargo

case came before Judge John Davis in Salem, Massachusetts, in which
the preceding arguments were presented.

Judge Davis followed the old

line Federalist doctrine, which gave a broad interpretation to the
Constitution, and backed the administration.

When he was censored for

his decision he defended himself by stating that "Congress has the
power to declare war.

It of course has the power to p r e p a r e . T h u s ,

Davis believed that by keeping American ships at home the nation was
conserving its resources which would be necessary should a war mater-

®^Heniy Adams, o£.
G^ibld., p. 268.

PP- 276-277.
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ialize.

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court in

the case of the United States vs. The William, although Joseph Story
commented, "I have ever considered the Embargo a measure which went
to the utmost limit of constructive power under the Constitution, be
ing in its very form and term an unlimited prohibition or suspension
of foreign commerce.
With the decision by the Court, the Embargo had passed all the
tests of government.

But, to give the law a fair test as to whether

or not an effective means of avoiding war had been discovered, enforce
ment had to be carried out with maximum efficiency.

^^Mortimer D. Schwartz, Joseph Story (Mew York, 19^9), p. 35.

CHAPTER VI

ENFORCEMENT:

AN IMPOSSIBILITY

Jefferson replied to the commercial and political assaults on
the Embargo by a show of force, for he felt that Congress must legal
ize any means necessary to enforce the bill.

The problem of compelling

obedience fell on the shoulders of Albert Gallatin, a task that was to
become increasingly difficult as the unpopularity of the Embargo con
tinued to mount.

Only the merchants as a class refused to sacrifice.

The mercantile group constituted a powerful block, and it was due to
their influence collectors in the New England area feared to act.

Yet,

even under adverse conditions, the collectors carried out their duties
faithfully.

Gallatin commented, "no better story of loyalty to admin

istrative work can be told, and that under very trying circumstances,
than that which may be found in the efforts of forgotten revenue and
naval officers.There were exceptions, of course.
York, Maine, was probably in collusion with smugglers.

The collector in
The collector

in New Bedford, Massachusetts, was removed and another resigned, Galla
tin believed due to fear.

There was also some lack of energy among the

collectors around Lake Ontario,

Among the prosecuting attorneys only

one man, a certain George Blake, wag proven disloyal to hia duties.
Even though the enforcement officers worked feverishly to enforce the Embargo, smuggling and other violationg continued to mount.

Ô&Leonard D. White, op. cit., p. kSh.
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The cause of many of these violations was the British guarantee of pro
tection to violators.

Such guarantees were made through British agents

in most of the seaboard towns.

These agents had been sent to the New

England area on the pretext of buying supplies for the fleet and armies.
John Henry, who was working in the interests of Sir James Craig, Gov87
ernor of Lower Canada, could be considered a spy.

He had been sent

into New England for no other purpose than to keep his hand on the
pulse of the nation and report the feelings of the people toward war
and the Embargo.
Resistance to commercial control and evasions of the Embargo
laws began almost as soon as the ships would be loaded.

Benjamin Weld,

a collector in New England expressed the following problem in reference
to the illegal trade with Canada:

"The articles can conveniently be

put across the line at night in fact we have reason to think the law
DO

is veiy much evaded and we have no means to prevent it."
grant violations began to be recorded.

Other fla

For example, the schooner

Charles left Boston for Charleston, but turned up in Lisbon, Portugal.
The captain excused himself by stating that he had run into bad weather
and had been forced to put into that distant port.
The northern shore of Massachusetts made enforcement extremely
difficult due to the numerous coves, bays, and inlets in that area.
Maine and New Hampshire also proved to be havens for violators.

These

geographical factors combined with the adverse temperament of the people
made enforcement extremely difficult,

Joseph Whipple, a collector in

Oo
"'John Henry, also notable in the famous Henry false document case.
®®Ibid., pp. Uij.3~UU.u
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Portsmouth, New Hampshire, reported that he had refused clearance to
the sloop Rhode, and the goods it carried were unloaded.
parted in ballast for York, Maine.

It then de

The goods it had been carrying

were simply taken overland and reloaded in York.

After being loaded

the vessel departed, but only after four men placed on the sloop by
the captain of a revenue cutter had been overpowered.

Whipple on hear

ing of the incident corresponded with Gallatin, noting that the collec
tor in York was no doubt in collusion with smugglers.
The number of violations continued to mount, accompanied ty in
creasing violence.

At one time an armed mob stopped the marshall from

taking into custody the vessel Marion.

Another example, this time

occurring in the overland smuggling around the Great Lakes, found
thirty armed men fighting twelve soldiers to regain twelve barrels of
potash.

Th^ were successful.

In September I808 a revenue cutter

pursued the vessel Black Snake and forced it ashore.

A skirmish fol

lowed in which a civilian was killed, the captain of the ship was
captured and promptly executed «
The Embargo on flour was particularly difficult to enforce, due
to the traffic along the coast.
Scotia and the West Indies.

Flour brought high prices in Nova

In order to curb this illegal traffic

Jefferson hit upon the device of a governor's certificate of need.

Any

community needing flour would send a request to the governor of their
respective states declaring such need, the governor in turn would sign
a certificate authorizing delivery.

Gallatin immediately expressed

the fear that Jefferson's new scheme would only lead to corruption in
the governors' chairs.

Gallatin's fears were not groundless, espec

ially in the case of Governor James Sullivan of Massachusetts.

Sullivan

sa
was willing to sign a certificate for almost anyone who asked, and did
so to such a degree that these were even for sale on the open market.
Even Sullivan's son wrote that his father gave cerfificates to anyone
who asked due to his ignorance of need.

Jefferson, on hearing of the

situation in Massachusetts, took immediate steps to stop the leak.

In

a letter to the Governor, he wrote that the state had called for a
year's supply of flour in two months and that Sullivan should issue no
more certificates of clearance.

His request was ignored.

Jefferson knew that for the law to be successful it had to be
enforced as vigorously as possible.

As a result a new array was created

and stationed along the Canadian frontier, gun boats and frigates pa
trolled the coast.

General Dearborn was told to move with troops to

any spot in the Northeast where smuggling might be going on.

In an

attempt to stop all illegal traffic the President refused to charter
a new packet line on Lake Champlain, for he noted that a new trade route
to Canada would only increase the means of smuggling.
appealed for food, Jefferson answered:

When Nantucket

"Our opinion here is that that

place has been so deeply concerned in smuggling, that if it wants it is
because it has illegally sent away what it ought to have retained for
89
its consumption."
To legalize these vigorous measures Jefferson was able to push
through Congress two additional Embargo laws and two Enforcement acts.
The first became law January 9, i808.

Under its terras fishing and

whaling ships were subject to bond as well as those vessels involved
in the coastal trade.

Departure without clearance or even touching a

^^Henry Adams, _o£. cit., p. 2^9.

foreign port was punishable by confiscation or^ if this was not possi
ble, the owner was to be fined double the value of the ship and cargo
and was "forever debarred from customs credit on goods imported."^0
The captain and every other person knowingly involved were subject to
fines of from $1,000 to $20,000 and the "captain's oath was forever
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thereafter inadmissible before any collector of customs."

The third Embargo passed March 12, l808, was designed to correct
hardship cases.

It concerned small vessels carrying supplies used in

daily living that traveled the coastal and inland waters.
now exempt from bonding requirements.

These were

Such exemptions were to last

only six weeks due to infractions of the laws.

The new law also al

lowed vessels in ballast to sail to foreign ports to bring home goods
belonging to American citizens.

Permission for such missions was sub

ject to bond not to export aty goods, and to return bringing no imports «
Foreign vessels engaged in the coastal trade were to be bonded to four
times the value of the ship and cargo to insure relanding in an Ameri
can port.

All bonds of vessels owned by citizens had to be matched

within four months by a collector's certificate of discharge which was
sent to the United States Treasury.

The last clause in the law made

it illegal under penalty of $10,000 fine and forfeiture of goods to
export by any means, land or sea.

This final clause was aimed at

stopping the overland trade with Canada, for these goods usually found
their way to England.
The fourth in the series was the Enforcement Act of April 2^,

y^Leonard D. White, op. cit., p. L27.
^^Ibid., p. I428.
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l808.

It ended the exemption of bond for coastal and inland vessels

and made it mandatory for every ship large or small to produce a
manifest, secure clearance, and furnish a certificate of landing.

No

vessel could receive clearance unless loaded under the inspection of
a collector.

No ship was allowed to depart for a port adjacent to

foreign territory without special permission from the President,,

Com

manders of war ships and gunboats were authorized to stop any ship on
suspicion, and foreign vessels involved in the coastal trade were now
barred

from such activity.

Collectors were authorized to detain any

coastal vessel on suspicion and a release could only come from the
President,

The collectors were also authorized to take into custody

"any unusual deposits of provisions, lumber, or other articles of

92

domestic growth or manufacture,"^
territory.

in any port adjacent to foreign

These goods could then be held for bond to insure their

delivery within the country.

The flow of traffic on the Mississippi

River was also subject to regulation, for all boats going down stream
had to stop at Fort Adams, Mississippi, and if going upstream, at
Iberville, Louisiana.
tire cargoes.

At these points they had to declare their en

When returning, if cleared, they were to turn over to

the officer who previously issued the certificate another certificate
stating the goods had been landed in a lawful port.

A two-month time

limit was established if the boat was going down stream, but if going
upstream a six-month interval was allowed.

The penalty for failure

to abide by these restrictions was a $1,000 to $5,000 fine.
The fifth and last in the series of Embargo Acts was the second

92ibid., p. k31.

Enforcement law, January 9, 1809»

The final law punished with forfeit

ure of the cargo and ships or other conveyance or with fines and for
feiture of the value of the cargos "any person loading on ship, vessel,
boat, watercraft, cart, wagon, sled, or other carriage or vehicle, with
or without wheels, any specie, goods, wares, or merchandise, with intent
to export or convey out of the United States,In addition, permits
from collectors were required to even load a vessel, and it reiterated
the requirement that the loading was to take place under inspection.
Under this law bonds of six times the value of ship and cargo were re
quired and collectors could demand suspicious goods to be unloaded.
To insure the ships relanding in the United States the law also stated,
"neither capture, distress, or other accident whatever, shall be pleaded
or given in evidence in any such suit,"^^ unless it could be proven
that the capture was hostile and the accident not due to negligence.
To enhance enforcement the President could use land and naval forces
and call out the militia.

He was also authorized to employ thirty

vessels for use in patrolling the coast.

With the passage of the final

law the only group of traders in the United States not subject to Em
bargo restrictions were the Indians of the frontier involved in the
fur trade with Canada.
Now that efficient enforcement was legal the problem of prose
cuting those accused of smuggling activities arose.

There were counter

claims and law suits brought against the collectors, which made some
hesitant about fulfilling their duties.

They might hold a suspicious

^^Dice Robin Anderson, op. cit., p . 1359blbld.

^8
cargo, but the question arose as to what was to be considered suspi
cious?

In an attempt to eliminate the fears of his agents, Gallatin

established the so-called one-eighth rule.
The one-eighth rule provided that ships could carry goods in
the coastal trade, except to ports adjacent foreign territory, if the
value of the cargo was one-eighth that of the bond posted.

The require

ment went beyond the laws, but gave the collectors something concrete
to stand on and at the same time permitted the necessary provisions to
be sent where they were needed,

A second problem arose with the courts,

for juries were reluctant to convict accused law breakers.

John Quincy

Adams in writing of this problem stated that the District Court of
Massachusetts after trying upward of forty cases of Embargo violations,
had adjourned without a single conviction.

9'D

In fact, one New England

juror had declared that he would never agree to an Embargo conviction.
In addition to the smuggling and legal entanglements some mer
chants simply refused to obey the law, a situation that became more and
more apparent in 1809 just before the Act was repealed.

To illustrate

the seriousness of the final situation a report received in March, 1009,
stated there were forty American ships in Liverpool, Embargo breakers,
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and more were expected.

Six months earlier Gallatin had stated that

the Embargo as a means of preventing war, and forcing England to res
pect American neutral rights, was defeated.

In his words?

"The Embargo

is now defeated by open violations, by vessels sailing without clearance
whatever; an evil which under the existing law we cannot oppose in any

^^Leonard D. White, op. cit., p. Ii^7«
96lbld., p. b70.
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way."^"^

The Enforcement Act of January 9, 1809, made opposition more

bitter and John Quincy Adams and Speaker of the House Joseph B. Varmim
both feared a collapse of the Union.
Even Jefferson reported that Congress fell under the belief that
the alternative was civil war or repeal.

Wilson Gary Nicholas, Repres

entative from Virginia, called for June 1, 1809, to be the date set for
repeal and that letters of marque and reprisal should be issued against
both France and England.

The Federalists were able to defeat both of

these measures, and the date for repeal was set for March h.

Jefferson

beat this dead line by three days, signing the bill March 1.

His great

experiment, as he said, collapsed "in a kind of panic."
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Nevertheless

he held to the belief that the Embargo would have been effective if
given a little more time.

When the War of I8l2 ended he declared, "a

continuance of the Embargo for two months longer would have prevented
our war.Thus, the era of the Embargo came to a close.

It had

been an effort brought about by extraordinary circumstances, for the
only other choices appeared to be war or submission to both England
and France.

^^Nathan Schachner, op. cit., p. 876.
^Leonard D. White, op, cit., p. L71.
99nIbid.

CHAPTER 711

EVIDENCE OF THE ADAMS

PAPERS ON JEFFERSON'S EMBARGO

John Quincy Adams once wrote, "the inhabitants of this mighty
empire are fellow citizens of one republic never to be dissolved.
Although that statement was made in 1829 it seems to reflect the basic
philosophy of his entire political career.
When Adams returned from Europe in I803, following a tour of
diplomatic duty, he was sent by the state of Massachusetts to serve
in the United States Senate.

Massachusetts had a tradition of federal

ism which the younger Adams was expected to uphold, but the New England
brand of federalism had been twisted to suit the mercantile interests.
The result was an inevitable clash between the Adams' philosophy of
serving the nation as a whole and the sectional interests of the North
east.

The rift opened when the Quincyite voted in favor of the Louis

iana Purchase.

Federalism was fighting for survival, and its adherents

saw in the purchase an undetermined number of future Democratic states.
These states, upon admission to the Union, would spell the final down
fall of the Federalist Party.

Adams believed the acquisition of

Louisiana would keep Napoleon out of the region, and thus secure the
peace and safety of the United States»

He was also convinced that

the addition of the territory would extend national power.

Adams fur

ther reasoned that if the territory remained in French hands it would

^""Henry Adams, Documents Relating to New England Federalism,
1800-1815 (Boston, 1877), p. 329.
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be subject to capture as enemy property by the British.
Many leading Federalists were angered over Adams' display of
independence.

The Essex Junto, led by Timothy Pickering, was parti

cularly vocal in accusing Adams of bolting the party for personal gain.
Stephen Higginson, Boston banker and leading Federalist, called him a
"kite without a tail."

Commenting further, Higginson declared, "he

will be violent and constant in his attempts to rise and will pitch on
1
one side and the other, as the popular Currents may happen to strike."
But as the Federalists were criticizing Senator Adams for his non
partisan reasoning on matters of foreign policy, relations between
England and France grew increasingly violent.

Each was determined to

ruin the other even if it meant a complete disregard of international
law.

John Quincy Adams supported the Administration as the nation

attempted to respond to the degrading onslaughts of England and France,
which resulted in his complete denunciation by the Federalist Party.
British aggressions against American shipping continued to mount
throughout the years l805 and i8o6 due to Sr. William Scott's decision
in the Essex case.

No longer could neutral vessels carry goods to the

European continent under the doctrine of broken voyage.

As the number

of seizures increased many Americans came to the conclusion that some
thing must be done.

John Quincy Adams was of the same opinion, and

served on the Senate committee which drafted a series of three reso
lutions protesting British actions and recommending non-importation
of British goods.

When the Non-Importation bill was presented for

Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of
American Foreign Policy (New York, T9h9), p. 123.

final vote, Senator Adams was the only Federalist in either congres
sional house to give his assent to the measure.

Again the Quincyite

had backed the Administration on matters of foreign policy, much to
the disgust of his constituents who

viewed the Non-Importation Act

as meaning a monetary loss, and as being pro-French.

The act, although

passed in April of I806, was not to go into effect until November 1 of
the same year.

In the meantime the Administration hoped that a treaty,

satisfactory to the United States, might be made.

To achieve that

desired goal, Jefferson sent William Pinkney of Maryland to join James
Monroe in England.

His instructions were to make a new treaty, which

would prohibit impressment and establish the doctrine of broken voyage.
A treaty was subsequently drawn which both Monroe and Pinkney signed»
Although it sanctioned the doctrine of broken voyage, no guarantees
regarding impressment were made.

Even the former concession had little

meaning, for Britain still insisted on the right to blockade the ports
controlled by France.

Also, the British reserved the right of retali

ation against the Berlin Decree, unless the United States registered
effective resistance to the French law.

A treaty signed under such

circumstances would have had little meaning, and in effect would have
made the United States a satellite of England.

Consequently, Jeffer

son refused to submit the proposed treaty to the Senate.
John Quincy Adams believed the President's course of action
correct.

He wrote that a treaty signed under such conditions would

only lead to war with France.

On the other hand the Esse.xmen supported

the treaty, for it would have meant closer ties with England, one of
the particular goals of that group.

Trade with England, even though

subject to regulation, was still a lucrative proposition.

Thus, it
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appears that the Federalist merchants were willing to suffer the British
aggressions rather than risk the loss of that outlet for their products.
The climax of British hostilities occurred June 22, l807, when
the Chesapeake was wantonly attacked.

When Adams received the news he

called upon the leading Federalists to support the government.

He felt

the outrage was a direct affront to the whole nation, and advocated
that some form of united action be taken.
willing to stand behind the nation.
publicly justified the incident.
doning impressment.

Instead, they belittled, and even

In so doing th^ were actually con

In response, the Republicans, headed by Elbridge

Gerry, held two town meetings in Boston.
both.

The Essex Junto was not

John Quincy Adams attended

At the first he served on a committee of seven which reported

a resolution that stated: "though we unite with our government in wish
ing most ardently for peace on just and honorable terms, yet we are
ready cheerfully to co-operate in any measures, however serious, which
may be judged necessary for the safety and honor of our country, and
will support them with our lives and fortunes."

Adams served as chair

man of the second gathering at which another resolution was passed
calling the British act "a wanton outrage upon the lives of our fellowcitizens, a direct violation of our national honor, and an infringement
109
of our national rights and sovereignty."

Thus, by late 1807, it

appeared that Adams was well on the way to a complete break with the
Federalist Party due to his stand on the Louisiana Purchase, the NonImportation Act, and the Chesapeake Affair.

However, the final separa

tion between Senator Adams and the Federalists occurred in December of

^^^Bennett Champ Clark, John Quincy Adams (Boston, 1932), p. 102.
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1807 when the Embargo became law.

Adams' support of that Issue, and

his service on the committee which reported the bill, caused the legis
lature of Massachusetts to appoint and begin instructing a replacement
nearly a year before his term in the Senate expired.

That situation

led to his resignation on June 8, 1808.
By November of I807 Adams seemed to be convinced that war with
England and France was impossible to avoid.

His conviction of impend

ing conflict he noted in his diary;
The opinion I have entertained for some months that this
Country cannot escape War is very much confirmed; it is a
prospect from which I would gladly turn my eyes. To n^r parents
- to my children - to my Country full of danger if not of ruin,
yet a prospect which there is scarce a hope left of an ending.
May I meet it as becomes a Man. ^
At that time Adams knew nothing of Jefferson's plans for an embargo.
In conversation with William Mitchell, Senator from New York, the sub
ject of whether or not the Administration had taken any steps for
vigorous action was discussed, and as far as either knew Jefferson had
not formulated a policy of any kind.

The President had advocated the

building of gunboats, but both Senators Adams and Mitchell viewed their
existence with disgust.

They were convinced that some other "measure

of energy" was necessary.Adams' belief in the need for stronger
actions to secure the honor of the nation, and his convictions that the
British were attempting to ruin American commerce, led him to propose
a resolution barring all foreign armed vessels from American ports

ï^^john Quincy Adams, "Diary in Abridgement," The Adams Papers,
Part I (Boston, 19$h), Microfilm reel Number 30, entry for November 9,
1807
lOiiibij^ ^ entry for November

11, I8O7.

6^
"with the exception of Distress, Dispatches, and Treaty rights.
The resolution wag rejected much to the joy of the Essex Junto who
"accused him of bringing forth an aggression bill."^^^
At this same time, across the ocean, British newspapers declared
that pending Anglo-American negotiations were to be transferred to the
United States.

According to Jefferson the transfer was an excellent

idea, because it would take time.

The President believed that in the

interlude England and France might make peace.

Jefferson had conveyed

these feelings to David Erskine, the British Ambassador.

When Senator

Adams heard of this conversation he not only voiced his opinion of the
Administration's policy, but at the same time revealed the fact that
he knew nothing of what Jefferson was planning.

He noted in his diary

that, "if there was any sincerity in these words Procrastination in
cludes the whole compass of Mr. Jefferson's policy, which I believe to
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be really the case."

On December IL, 1807, Adams again noted his

ignorance of Administrative plans.

Hearing the news of the British

Proclamation of October l6, 1807, legalizing impressment, he wrote in
i

a letter to his brother Thomas s

"The British Proclamation brings in

deed very near to an issue the general question of impressment from
our merchant vessels.

How, or whether we shall parry it I am not yet

informed.The final impressment issue caused Adams to lend even

^^^Ibid., entry for November 17, l807.
^^^Samuel Flagg Bemis, op. cit., p. lL2.
^^"^Microfilm reel Number 30, op. cit., entry November 27, i807.
*} 0R

John Quincy Adams, "Letters Received and Other Loose Papers,"
The Adams Papers, Part III (Boston, 1957), Microfilm reel Number hO^,
December lit, 1607.
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greater support to Jefferson, for he like the President was "not pre
pared to put the fortunes of this country upon the dias of War, for
the unqualified pretention of protecting all men without exception on
board our merchant vessels.

Still less for the pretense of protecting
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Deserters from foreign ships public or private."
Jefferson had continued to hope for peace in Europe, which he
believed would end America's problems.

He was doomed to disappointment,

for hostilities between France and England continued to mount.

He was

definitely opposed to war, but on December 17, l807, when he received
the unofficial report of the Orders in Council of November 11, 180?,
barring all neutral vessels from ports other than those controlled by
England, he knew some form of action was necessary.

To Jefferson, the

Embargo appeared to be the only solution short of war, a means of keep
ing American commerce out of British hands.

Thus, on December 18, 1807,

he sent a special message to the Senate calling for such a measure.
After the Presidential report was read it appeared to the majority in
Congress that Napoleon was determined to carry into full effect the
decrees of November 21, 1806, without regard for American neutrality.
The message also contained England's proclamation recalling her seamen
and authorizing impressment, but did not mention the news of the Orders
of November 11, 1807.
question.

Senator Adams voted with the majority on the

But, in a letter to his father dated December 27, 1807, he

noted his lack of faith in the newly enacted law as an effective meas
ure of forcing England and France to halt their aggressions.
ence once again to the impressment issue he wrote;
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Ibid., December lU, l807.

In refer

"The British
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Proclamation, expressly commanding impressment from our merchant ves
sels, and assuming in the fact a right of annulling our laws of
naturalization, has given again a new and darker complection to our
We ought not I think to suffer

old controversies on that subject.

this encroachment and yet I know not how we can take a stand against
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it without coming to immediate war."

To Adams the Embargo was only a temporary and defensive measure,
for he was well aware that the United States was sorely unprepared for
war.

Yet, submission to the orders and decrees was equally distaste

ful.

Thus, he believed that the Bnbargo was the only alternative.

He

made this position quite clear when he wrote that:
Our prospects (for peace) have indeed been growing more
gloonçr from day to day and we have now, at the express call
of the President, an unlimited Embargo. To this measure,
as merely precautionary and defensive I gave ngr assent and
vote. Under the decrees of France and Great Britain dooming
to capture and confiscation all our ships and cargoes trad
ing with either of those powers we had no other alternative
left, but this or taking our side at once in the War. I do
not believe indeed that the Embargo can long be continued—
but if we let our ships go out without arming them author
izing them to resist the decrees, they must go merely to
swell the plunder of the contending parties.
The result of Senator Adams' support of the Administration was
the immediate condemnation by his constituents.

His reply to the as

saults not only reflect his independent attitude, but the vigor with
which he supported what he believed to be the best interests of the
nation as a whole.

Nonetheless, Adams was well aware that the stand

he had taken might cost him his Senate seat.

In his personal diary

^^^Ibid., John Quincy Adams to John Adams, December 27, 1807.
llllbid.
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he noted:
On most of the great national questions now under discus
sion, nçr sense of duty leads me to support the administration,
and I find myself of course in opposition to the federalists
in general. But I have no Communication with the President
other than that in the regular order of business. In this
state of things cçr situation calls in a peculiar manner for
prudence; ngr political prospects are declining, and as my
term of service draws near its close, I am constantly ap
proaching to the certainty of being restored to the situation
of a private citizen. For this Event however, I hope to have
lïçr mind sufficiently prepared. In the meantime I implore
that Spirit from whom every good and perfect gift descends
to enable me to render essential service to ny Country, and
that I may never be governed in ray public conduct by any
consideration other than that of qy duty.^-12
In short, Adams broke with the Federalist Party due to their
justification of British aggressions.

Senator William Plumer, of New

Hampshire, wrote Adams noting the Federalist position and expressing
regrets.

His letter stated;

"I regret that so many of our federal

papers abound with publications justifying the conduct of Britain and
with invectives against our own government.

Many of those writers

appear to have their pens dipped in the gall of party, evinces a de
termination, at all events, to condemn the measures of their country,
and to approve of those of their and our enençr.

In times like these,

we ought to feel as Americans, rise superior to the interests of
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party."

Plumer could certainly sympathize with Adams, for he like

the Quincyite had taken his stand against England, which "rendered him
as unpopular with the Exeterites in New Hampshire as Adams had become
-I -| 1

with the Essex Junto in Massachusetts."

^^%icrofilm reel No. 30, op. cit., entry December 27, 1807.
^^^Microfilm reel I|.05, op. cit., December 22, l807.
^^^Lynn ¥. Turner, William Plumer of New Hampshire (Chapel Hill,
1962), p. 181,
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Soon after the Embargo was enacted into law John Quincy Adams
corresponded with Governor James Gullivan»

In a lengthy letter he

explained his understanding as to the causes of the Embargo, and at
the same time presented his personal views as to why it was necessary.
He explained the causes by illustrating five basic points.

First, the

measure was expressly recommended by Jefferson after the latter had
received news of the most recent British orders and French decrees.
Secondly, he noted that Anglo-American negotiations had been trans
ferred to the United States, and that a squadron of British warships
was standing off the coast. Adams believed that the British offers
would be unacceptable, and when negotiations were broken off these
warships would begin hostilities.

His thoughts regarding the accept

ability of the British offers later proved to be correct, for had the
United States consented to the British demands degradation would have
been the result.

The existence of warships off the nation's coast

caused Adams to feel that the wisest move was to keep American ships
in their home ports, thus keeping them out of British hands.

Next, he

mentioned to Sullivan the Orders of November 11, 180?, which were in
tended to force all neutral vessels to pass through ports under British
control.

Adams believed this requirement would only cause American

commerce "to become British commerce."

His fourth point presented the

idea that the Embargo would throw sailors out of work, and those who
were British would return to the ships of their own nation.

To Adams,

the return of these men would be desirable from the standpoint that,
"it would take away the only pretext the British have to offer for en
gaging in a quarrel with us."

Finally, he noted that the Embargo was

to be an experiment, not only to test the support of the people toward
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the government, but to discover whether or not it could be used as a
11 <
successful instrument in preventing war.

Needless to say Timothy

Pickering and the other leading Federalists were not convinced of the
Embargo's necessity.

They not only criticized the law itself, but

levied a bitter assault against those who had supported the measure.
Adams realized the immediate public resentment, and that reali
zation may have caused him to have some doubts over the necessity of
the Bnbargo.

The doubt in Adams' mind became apparent on January 11,

l808, when he introduced a motion calling for the appointment of a
committee to inquire as to when the Embargo might be repealed.

The

motion failed.
The Senior Adams also noted the resentment in Massachusetts.

In

his letter of January 17, l808, he not only reported the existing cir
cumstances, but also advised his son on a course of action.

His letter

contained the following statements
The Embargo is a stroke instantaneously felt, and mil be
more and more irksome every day. I will not presume to con
jecture how long this stagnation of business can be borne, but
I certainly know it will not be tolerated many months. Congress
will be forced to the alternative of granting Letters of Mark
(Marque) letting loose privateers, and sending out Frigates, or
repealing the law. This Congress and the Administration I am
convinced will never declare war against her (England). ¥e
shall remain therefore in this state of inactivity till the
people will burst open the irons we have closed upon the oceans,
either by overawing Congress, or by downright disobedience to
the Laws. My advice to you is, steadily pursue the course you
are in, with moderation and caution however, because I think
t^Iô
it is a path of justice. But you must ere long vote for repeal.
From the tone of his letter it appears that the elder Adams was also

^^^Microfilm reel LO^, op. cit., John Quincy Adams to James
Sullivan, January 7, l808.
^'^%bid., John Adams to John Quincy Adams, January 17, l808.

71
losing faith in the Federalist Party.
On January 23, i8o8, John Quincy Adams again aroused the wrath
of the Essex Junto by attending the Republican presidential caucus.
James Madison was the popular choice, and Adams, on becoming aware of
the overwhelming majority, also voted in Madison's favor.

It is in

teresting to note at the caucus a single vote was cast for John Quincy
Adams for Vice-President.
Following the Republican caucus Adams realized that his days in
the Senate were numbered.

He had backed the Administration on the

major issues of the time, and for his efforts had gained the unceasing
condemnation of the Essex Junto,

The Pickering group launched its as

sault upon the Quincyite for his alleged statement that he "would not
deliberate" on the Embargo question, but that he would act immediately.
Senator Adams replied to the accusation in a letter to the editor of
the Palladium in which he stated:
You are requested to state to the public that John Quincy
Adams never said in the Senate of the United States that, he
would not deliberate. He confidently believes that he never
used the words; he is certain that if he did use them it was
in connection with other words which gave them a meaning en
tirely different from that which has been imputed to him.
The sentiments which he did express were these; That the
commerce and seamen of the United States were threatened with
the most imminent dangers, that besides the official documents
sent with the President's Message recommending the Embargo that
officer perhaps have received information which could not be
communicated to Congress, but which might concur with the offi
cial papers, in producing the recommendation in the message.
That under these circumstances^ what ever doubt might have
remained upon his mind in considering only those two papers,
he could not allow them to weigh against the express recom
mendation of the first Magistrate upon his high responsibility
of the Nation. That he could not justify it to himself or his
country, if in such a state of things he should refuse his
assent to the measure thus required. That having come to this
conclusion, he was against postponing the final decision of
the question in the Senate to another day.
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For these sentiments he is willing to abide by the judgment
of his country, of the world, and of posterity. The expression
of subserviency to the recommendation of the President, and
the refusal to deliberate, which have been imputed to him he
explicitly denies.Ï17
Adams had begun to fight back against the Junto, but from the tone of a
letter to his brother he was rapidly realizing the futility of such a
struggle when he wrote:

"I have no personal views or expectations what

so ever 0 nothing to ask nothing even to wish»

That the only reason

upon which I have supported the Administration is a conviction that
th^ are struggling to maintain the best interests and rights of the
country.
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Whether this answer was satisfactory or not is unimportant."

Nevertheless, Adams had cause to worry.

He had seen the letter

of intrigue from Sir James Craig, Governor of Lower Canada, in which
Jefferson was accused of being pro-French.

The Craig letter reported

that Napoleon intended to conquer England's possessions in North Amer
ica, and divide the United States by forcing the nation to declare war
119
on England.

The President was supposedly aware of, and in agree

ment with the plot.

The letter was circulated among the members of

the Junto, who in turn never lost an opportunity to proclaim its ac
cusations of French influence publicly.

Theophilus Parsons repeated

the Federalist lament that the people of the United States had been
corrupted by France, and were well on the road to being given over to

John Quincy Adams, "Letters Received and Other Loose Papers,"
The Adams Papers, Part III (Boston, 1957), Microfilm reel Number Uo6,
1808, no other date recorded.
^^^Microfilm reel li05, og. cit., John Quincy Adams to Thomas
Adams, February 6, l808.
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The original of the Craig letter has never been found.
is John Quincy Adams' report of its contents.

This
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120 The charges of French influence caused

control by that country.

Adams to seek a conference with Jefferson in March of I808.

At the

meeting on March 1^, the topics of discussion were the works of the
Essex Junto, and whether or not
any French demands.

the Chief Executive had consented to

Th^concluded that the actions of the Junto were

unpatriotic, and Jefferson assured Adams that he "had never had any
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understanding whatever with Napoleon."

Adams was now convinced

that he had pursued the proper course, and that Jefferson had the
best interests of the nation first and foremost in his mind.
A pamphlet written by Timothy Pickering was to become the bible
of the Essex Junto.

Its author used every available criticism of the

Embargo and had hundreds of copies distributed throughout New England.
He even went so far as to openly recommend that the United States
should accede to British demands.

John Quincy Adams replied to this

publication in a lengthy letter addressed to Harrison Gray Otis.

In

his letter Adams reaffirmed his belief that every American citizen
should support the existing Administration in that time of crisis re
gardless of party ties.

He openly condemned Pickering for calling upon

the legislature of Massachusetts to nullify the Embargo.

Adams felt

that if a state could set aside a federal law the nation would no longer
exist.

Instead, it would break into small sections of vested interest.

If such a situation was to occur he noted that these sections could
very readily slip back into the waiting arms of England.

When Picker-

1 ?n
Theophilus Parsons, judge in the Massachusetts Supreme Court,
John Quincy Adams had gained much of his knowledge of law by studying
under Parsons.
Samuel Flagg Bemis, op. cit., p. 162.
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ing argued that trade should be resumed, Adams replied that if such
a circumstance was to happen it would only mean that American com
merce would once again be subjected to British restriction and regu
lation.

To Adams, the ability of the British to continue seizing

American ships would only mean a "sacrifice of everything that can
give value to the name of freemen," and "abandonment of the very right
1 22
of self-preservation."

Adams also believed the resumption of trade

would only constitute submission to England and allow them control
over American commerce.

He felt such a circumstance would not only

degrade the nation, but lead to war with England's enemies.

As he

stated, the United States would be "doomed to share the destinies of
her [England's] conflict, with a World in arras.Impressment was
adjudged by Pickering not to be a cause for the Embargo.

The leader

of the Essex Junto argued that the impressment question was of little
importance, because the number impressed was small, it was impossible
to distinguish an Englishman from an American, and impressed Americans
were released when sufficient evidence of their origin was presented.
Adams refused to accept these arguments, contending that the number
of times the act was committed made little difference.

Referring to

Pickering's second and third arguments, he wrote:
It is not from the impossibility of distinguishing English
from American seamen, that this crime is committed; examine
the official returns made to the Department of State, and you
will find that the British officers often take men from mere
resentment, from malice to this country, from the wantonness
of power, or when they manifest the most tender regard for

^^^Microfilm reel ii06, op. cit., John Quincy Adams to Harrison
Gray Otis, i808, no other date recorded.
123ibid., John Quincy Adams to H. G. Otis, i808,
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the neutral rights of America; they lament that they want the
men. They regret the necessity, but they must have their
complement. In the mean time, the impressed native American
Citizens, upon duly authenticated proof, are delivered up
indeed! The process is time consuming, the sailor might be
in a distant port, it might have been taken by the French.^ ^
Adams persisted in his arguments regarding impressment, stating that
the United States had never denied England's right to recall her seamen
in time of war, but he insisted that the basic question was whether or
not the British had the right to take them forcibly while in the ser
vice of this nation.

The Pickering Pamphlet went on to belittle the

significance of the Chesapeake Affair.

Its author even insinuated

that England had made restitution by recalling Lord Berkely in disgrace.
Adams answered that comment by noting that Lord Berkely was not recalled,
but instead was given the compliments of Lord Halifax.

The lack of

justice caused Adams to believe the British never seriously intended
to make reparations for the Chesapeake Affair.

Commenting on the lack

of energy in the British government concerning an honorable relation
ship with the United States, Adams wrote;

"A liberal and a hostile

policy towards America, are among the strongest marks of distinction
between the political systems of the rival statesmen of that Kingdom.
It may be inconceivable, that there is a party, of great weight and
influence, in the Councils of the Country, who never have abandoned
the hope and expectation of reducing again these United States to the
condition of British Colonies.

That party is now in higher power than

12<
at any period since the year 1793."

^^^Ibid.5 John Quincy Adams to Harrison Gray Otis, l808,
^^^Ibid., John Quincy Adams to Harrison Gray Otis, 1808.
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The Orders in Council of November 11, I8O8, were not contained
in Jefferson's message to Congress, but Adams had been forewarned of
their existence by reading the London and Liverpool newspapers.

Pick

ering failed to mention their existence to which Adams commented, "This
singular omission, is to me the more surprising, because these orders,
furnished one of the most decisive considerations, which induced me to
vote for the Embargo, at the time when it was laid; because they to
gether with the subsequent retaliating decrees of France and Spain have
furnished the only reason upon which I have acquiesced in its continu1 pA
ance to this day."

In final rebuttal Adams noted that, "the whole

tenor of his jpickering'^ arguments goes to persuade us that on all
points we ought to yield to the pretensions of Britain,

It is a sum

mons to surrender, in behalf of our Enengr, issued from the centre of
our own camp.

A denial of our dearest rights, issued from the veiy
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sanctuary which should protect them."
Adams in his thinking had placed the best interests of the nation
above those of his constituents to whom the Embargo meant an ever-shrinking purse.

The result was venomous criticism, and the accusation that

he had bolted the party.

An example of the type of abuse he was to

suffer came in an anonymous letter dated March 8, I8O8.
writer remarked:

The unknown

"It is said that the whole of Mr. Quincy Adams' doings

are involved in ixystery.

There is no mystery in them.

When the public

interest is sacrificed for private views what will a man do in order to
appear to be patriotic?

Lucifer son of the morning, how hast thou

^^^Ibid., John Quincy Adams to Harrison Gray Otis, I8O8.
^^'^Ibid., John Quincy Adams to Harrison Gray Otis, I8O8,
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fallen?

¥e hope not irrecoverably.

Return to Massachusetts.
1 28
time."

Oh Adams remember -who thou art.

Return to thy Country,

Awake—arouse in

That letter was simply signed "A Federalist," but it serves

to illustrate Federalist feelings, and was a warning that more assaults
were to follow.

Adams soon found his name being attached to such un

flattering expressions as, "one of those amphibious politicians, who
lives in both land and water, and occasionally resorts to each, but
who finally settle down in the mud."

He waa called a "party scavenger,"

a "popularity seeker," and it was said that he was "courting the pre
vailing party."

These same critics also said that John Quincy Adams
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was "unworthy of confidence" and was one of "Bonaparte's Senators."

Many Federalist critics also attacked Adams from the standpoint that
he had supported the Embargo to promote selfish interests.
As the time for Congressional adjournment neared in i8o8 Adams'
unpopularity had become extremely evident.

In a letter received March

2h, 1808, he read the unencouraging report that, "On your return you
must exprct to find yourself in a strange land.

The sour looks and the

spiteful leers will not be few, that you will have to encounter.
Thomas Adams also commented on the Federalist meeting in Boston in
which the Embargo was condemned as being a law without motive, and that
it had been levied at the insistence of France.

Through the early

months of i8o8 conflict continued to mount in Massachusetts, not only

128Microfilm reel hO$, op. cit., anonymous to John Quincy Adams,
March 8, i808.
^^^Sarauel Flagg Bemis, op. cit., p. liiB.
130
Microfilm reel hOS, ££• cit., Thomas Adams to John Quincy
Adams, March 2ii, i808.
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over the Embargo, but on the question of whether or not John Quincy
Adams should keep his seat in the Senate.
The elder Adams had noted with concern his son's growing unpopu
larity in Federalist circles, but this was a secondary topic in his
letter of April 12, I8O8.

His correspondence of that date noted the

impact of the Embargo, and speculated on the possibility of internal
rupture within the nation.

Still he offered no solution to either

dilemma when he wrote;
The Embargo tingles in every vein. The clamour against it
will grow louder and louder, and every man who voted for it
will grow more and more unpopular with the party who oppose it.
A repeal of the Embargo Laws, would instantly expose many rash
adventures to burn their sails. Arming their vessels would be
of little or no use, without Frigates to convoy and protect
them. The present Congress will never declare war against
England or France. Neither of those powers will declare war
against us, more explicitly than they have done already. Are
we then to remain for years in this situation? We might be
more disposed to war among ourselves, than we are to fight
with ary foreign power. The present humiliation of the Nor
thern states cannot long continue, without^producing passions
which will be very difficult to restrain.
While the Federalists were raging against Adams, the Republicans
were welcoming him into the fold.

The Republican newspaper, the Essex

Register of Salem, Massachusetts, called him, "an Atlas unshaken by the
roaring blasts of Federalism."

Another, the Independent Chronicle of
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Boston, praised him as, "the ablest member of the American Senate."
These epistles of Republicanism even went so far as to forecast that
Adams, due to his change in politics, might one day become President.
It is doubtful at this juncture that Adams considered himself either a

^^^Miorofilm reel i1o6, op. cit., John Adams to John Quincy Adams,
April 12, 1808.
1*^2
Samuel Flagg Bemis, op. cit., p. 1)48.
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Federalist or a Republican. In truth he was not a party man.

He made

that position quite clear when he wrote, "any measure which emanates
from Mr. Jefferson, which I believe correct, will receive ny most cor
dial support.

Measures, which in ny conscience I believe wrong, I shall

133
as warmly oppose, let them come from what source they may."
The struggle over the Embargo continued to mount throughout the
year I8O8.
losses.

Tempers flared in the New England area due to monetary

Some Federalists advocated secession from the Union, while

others simply encouraged disobedience to the law.

Levi Lincoln called

that critical period, "one of the most animated, active, and violent
*L 3)'
political conflicts I have ever witnessed."
The climax of the Adams fight with the Essex Junto came June 3,
1808, for on that date the legislature of Massachusetts voted 21 to 17
in favor of James Lloyd as Senator.

To Adams this simply meant that

he had been recalled, for his term did not expire until March k, 1809.
Noting the feeling of the Massachusetts legislature he resigned his
Senate post June 8, I808.

The following excerpts from his personal

diary explain Adams' thoughts at that time:

"The election was preci

pitated for the sole purpose of specially marking me.

For it ought,

in regular order, not to have been made until the winter session of the
Legislature.

Th^ also passed resolutions enjoining upon their Sena

tors a course of conduct which neither try judgment could approve nor
ity spirit brook.

I therefore resigned iry seat."^^^

^3%icrofilm reel L06, ._0£. cit., I8O8, no other date given.
"^-^'"^Ibid., Levi Lincoln to John Quincy Adams, April I8, I8O8.
13'o
Microfilm reel 30, op. cit., entry July 11, I8O8.
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Although the attacks upon him by the Pickering organization had

been bitter and caustic, John Quincy Adams could take comfort in the
support given him by his family and close friends.

His father gave

full approval to his son's conduct, even though he felt Jefferson's
policy was ridiculous from the standpoint that the Bjibargo could not
be enforced.

The elder Adams made his position quite clear when he

wrote:
Having explained to you ry sincere judgment of the frank
opinions of your present and past conduct, I shall now tell
you that I fully approve it. Your votes for gunboats, and
Non-Importation Laws, ridiculous as are the object I' consider
as mere implements. These measures considered on the great
national scale can do little good or little harm.
The Embargo I cannot blame, though I know its duration must
be short. That of 1775 and that of 179li, I had opportunity to
observe. Yesterday, about one hundred sailors marched in pro
cession in Boston, and the same will be done in every seaport
very soon. You may as well drive hoops of wood or iron on a
barrel of gunpowder, to prevent its explosion when a red hot
heater is in the center of it, as pretend to enforce an Embargo
on this country for six months. It would be utterly impracti
cable, if you had a regular amy of ten thousand men employed
with all their bayonetts to keep the peace. In our country
produce has fallen already fifty per cent, you may infer what
will happen in a few.months. Repeal or war will be the alter
native, veiy soon.
A short time later, apparently in a moment of petulance, the old Puritan
remarked that he would declare war against England, France, and Spain.
Having done so, the nation could expand its boundaries by taking Florida
and Mexico.

At the same time he mentioned that the nation could resume

commerce if only by the capture of foreign vessels.

John Quincy's

younger brother Thomas also added his support by referring to his
117
brother's actions as being "in the true interests of the nation."

^^^Microfilm reel iiO^, op. cit., John Adams to John Quincy Adams,
January 8, 1808.
^^'^Ibid. ) Thomas Adams to John Quincy Adams, February 19, 1808.
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Others rallied to Adams' stand,

William Custis spoke of Timothy Pick

ering's actions and those of the Junto as being shameful apologists
for British aggressions.

William Cunningham, in a letter of December

17, 1808, also defended Adams* position.

He wrote that, "If party rage

had intercepted and thrown aside the tribute of merit which has been
expressed by truth, its violence can have no present object in impeding
the fair examination of his pretentions to the unabated confidence of
his countrymen. ... I would ask neither candour nor charity to de138
fend him; his defense is perfect,"
After Adams' resignation from the Senate the Republican Party
urged him to re-enter the political arena.

He was asked to run for a

seat in the House of Representatives, but as a Republican candidate.
Adams declined, preferring to follow the advice of his father to resume
his law practice, and his professorship at Harvard.

He excused himself

by stating that he did not wish to run against an old friend, Josiah
Quincy.

He also refused to accept the Republican nomination for governor

of Massachusetts, largely on his father's advice.
John Quincy Adams had realized that his open letter to Harrison
Gray Otis would not be sidely publicized, and that for his stand on the
Embargo question he would be considered a political heretic.

He had

acted exclusively on his own principles and received for his efforts
the bitter rebuke of his party.

He had defied the demands of his party,

and had been reduced to the ranks of the private citizen.

Still, even

though he returned to Massachusetts anqt resumed the practice of law, he
was kept informed on issues of national significance.

It might even be

^^^Microfilm reel U06, op. cit., William Cunningham to John Quincy
Adams, December 17, I8O8.
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suggested that he had as much influence on national policy-making when
out of the Senate as he had when sitting with that body.

Friends in

Congress kept him informed, and his advice was often requested.

These

friends, through their constant expressions of fear over the unity of
the nation, may have caused him to change his mind about the Embargo
139
for he began advocating repeal.
Nathan Parker, one such correspondent, expressed the fears of
the time, and asserted one cause for the Embargo's failure.

In a letter

to Adams dated November 2$, l808, he wrote:
We have not only the belligerent powers of Europe to contend
with, but the internal discontent and prejudice into which the
people of the New England states are driven by those who are
unfriendly to the national Government. ¥e have been informed
that a meeting of a number has, or is soon to take place in
Connecticut to agree on measures for calling a Convention in
New England to devise means to effect a division of the Union.
There was a fair prospect of the British ministry's doing us
justice or at least agreeing to such terms as we could except
(sic) without compromising our honor in June, but when the
Spanish revolution was known and they had news of the discontents
in America their tone changed.
And when I am informed that a body of troops are at Halifax
ready to embark their destination unknown I should not be sur
prised if a plot should unfold, compared with which Burr's would
dwindle to nothing.^^0
J. Pitcairn also noted the fact that the Embargo was not having the de
sired effect, due to Britain's enjoyment of a trade monopoly with Spain

^•39it might also be suggested that Adams may have caused many
Republicans to change their minds regarding the ultimate success of
the Embargo. His frequent correspondence with members of that party
may have influenced them to put sufficient pressure on Jefferson to
cause the Fresident to relax his steadfast support of the measure.
^^%icrofilra reel 1|06, o£o cit., Nathan Parker to John Quincy
Adams, November 25, l808.
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and Portugal and their colonies.

Other reports stressed the inability

to enforce the Embargo, while still others complained that if the law
was continued national bankruptcy would occur.

To Adams, the strong

est argument for repeal was the threat of Northeastern secession.

He

had voted for the Embargo to promote union within the nation, now with
the threat of disunion he had no other choice but to favor repeal and
be consistent in his philosophy»
By February of l809 not only Adams, but a majority in Congress
were convinced that the Embargo had to be repealed.

On February 8, 1809,

the House of Representatives passed a bill setting March U, as the day
the Embargo should end.
When it was agreed that repeal was the only alternative, the
question arose as to what should replace it.
of Congress could not agree.

On this issue the members

England still refused to acknowledge Amer

ican neutral rights, and Napoleon had not withdrawn the Berlin and Milan
Decrees.

Regarding that puzzling situation Adams wrote, "They [House of

Representatives] talked of issuing letters of Marque and Reprisal; but
th^ have now decided against that.
chants to arm their vessels.

They talk of authorizing the mer

But neither will that succeed.

They now

talk of non-intercourse with France and England—of excluding armed
vessels, of all Nations from our Ports, of raising 15,000 men, of bortowing ten millions of Dollars.

It would be passing strange if they

should finish by doing nothing at all„"^^^

Yet, the majority agreed

that some stand against the aggressors should be taken.

Jefferson

l^ljohn Quincy Adams, "Letters Received and Other Loose Papers,"
The Adams Papers, Part III (Boston, 19^7), Microfilm reel Number 1(.07,
Februaiy 8, 1809.
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would offer no plan due to his wish not to saddle James Madison, his
chosen successor, with a pre-formulated policy.

Thus, the matter

rested solely in the hands of a debating Congress.

Finally, on March

2, 1809, William Branch Oiles introduced the Non-Intercourse bill,
which was subsequently passed.

There is some speculation that John

Quincy Adams may have suggested it to Giles, since at that time they
were friends and frequent correspondents.
bitter enemies,
and on March

Later, they would become

Adams was in Washington for Madison's inauguration,
1809, wrote his wife expressing his views on the Em

bargo's repeal and the newly enacted Non-Intercourse Act.
contained the following statements

His letter

"Congress you know have broken up,

after repealing partially the Embargo, after the l$th of this month,
and totally at the end of the next session of Congress substituting a
non-intercourse with France and England to commence on the 20th of May.
l!i2
I believe nothing better upon the whole could have been done."
For John Quincy Adams the era of the Embargo had ended, but the
criticism by the mercantile interests for his support of the measure
would never end.

He had begun the era as a Federalist, but ended it

being embraced as a Republican.

In truth, John Quincy Adams was neither

a Federalist or a Republican in a party sense.

He had never stopped at

the party line when it came to issues which he considered necessary for
the nation as a whole.

^^^Ibid., John Quincy Adamg to his wife, March

l809.
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